By: Sameer Lalwani; Happymon Jacob January<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Sameer Lalwani<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n After Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, many of the world\u2019s major democracies lined up to condemn Russian aggression and rally to Ukraine\u2019s defense. India did not. It abstained on key votes at the United Nations and refused to denounce its longtime partner. The backlash that ensued was striking; numerous governments expressed frustration with India for its reluctance to condemn the indefensible.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Some observers have suggested that, as a result, India may be changing course; they see signs that it may finally be considering breaking with Russia. In September, Indian Prime Minister\u00a0Narendra Modi<\/a>\u00a0told Russian President Vladimir Putin that \u201ctoday\u2019s era is not of war\u201d\u2014remarks that seemed to admonish the Russian president and which U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken described as \u201csignificant.\u201d In\u00a0Foreign Affairs<\/em>, political scientist Happymon Jacob\u00a0explained<\/a>\u00a0that New Delhi is \u201cwithdrawing from its long partnership with Russia\u201d and aiming to hew more closely to the United States. In this reading of events, India is turning its back on Russia and concluding that it needs to strengthen its ties to the West.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But at least some of these expectations remain aspirations more than real possibilities. U.S. policymakers need to plan around the reality of enduring Indian-Russian ties, which Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar extolled as \u201cstrong and steady\u201d during a visit to Moscow in November. India should diversify its partnerships away from Russia, given the latter\u2019s disregard for territorial sovereignty, its growing dependence on China, and the unreliable weapons Russia supplies. But despite Russia\u2019s bad behavior, India<\/a> is not ready to jettison such an important partnership. U.S. policymakers should help India realize that Russia is a liability, but they should not penalize New Delhi for its continued relations with Moscow as long as they can count on India to play a larger and more active role in countering Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Analysts have divined evidence of India\u2019s attempt to distance itself from Russia in the words and deeds of its officials. They point to Modi\u2019s verbal confrontation with Putin<\/a> in September, some votes opposing Russia at the United Nations, and the cancellation of billions of dollars in Russian weapons purchases, including fighter aircraft and helicopters. However intriguing, these developments do not, in truth, indicate that New Delhi has taken a definitive turn away from Moscow.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Washington Post <\/em>cast Modi\u2019s comments to Putin in September as a \u201crebuke.\u201d Yet Modi\u2019s statement was less an admonishment of Russian policy and more an expression of concern about rising food and energy prices. Several Indian assessments have cautioned against overinterpreting Modi\u2019s comments, pointing out their consistency with past Indian positions criticizing the war\u2019s costly impacts on the global South. India did side with the West on some procedural votes at the UN, such as the one in September to allow Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky<\/a> to address the UN General Assembly. But India reverted to abstention in a more substantive October vote on Russia\u2019s illegal annexation of four Ukrainian provinces.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is also true that, earlier this year, India canceled several agreed purchases of Russian weapons, such as the MiG-29 fighter plane. But that decision had less to do with Russia than with trying to boost domestic arms production. The Indian government had already planned to scrap those deals (along with the purchase of Boeing P-8I aircraft from the United States) months before Russia\u2019s invasion to instead transition to using indigenous equipment as part of its \u201cSelf-Reliant India\u201d initiative. India has not canceled other major procurements of Russian arms, such as S-400 air defenses, stealth frigates, and nuclear submarines, which will keep New Delhi tethered to Moscow for decades. In truth, India cannot break with Russia; the latter serves too important a role in Indian geopolitical calculations, supports much of India\u2019s military arsenal, and remains popular among Indian political elites.<\/p>\n\n\n\n India has long counted Russia an invaluable partner in its strategy of \u201cmulti-alignment,\u201d in which New Delhi refuses to form exclusive alliances with any great power in the hope of maintaining productive strategic partnerships with several. Indian leaders believe this strategy remains sound because Western analysts have misjudged Russia in several important ways.<\/p>\n\n\n\n My research has found that despite the force of Western sanctions, Indian national security officials believe in Russian staying power. They expect Europe to buckle under the pressure of inflation and energy shortages and Russia to be buoyed by rising commodity prices. After all, Indian companies are investing in Russian energy projects, such as the extraction of oil and gas in Sakhalin, in the Russian Far East, and doubling down on future collaborative research and the development of some defense technologies, including the BrahMos cruise missile. Indian leaders also believe that the war in Ukraine will most likely become a military stalemate, ended by a negotiated cease-fire and then a future settlement that would allow Russia to reintegrate into the international community.<\/p>\n\n\n\n New Delhi is also convinced that the Kremlin will remain a significant geopolitical power that can help India. Russia can still provide India with diplomatic backing in the UN Security Council and command considerable influence in India\u2019s broader continental neighborhood. India still counts on Russia for missile technology, for nuclear reactors used in submarines, and for hypersonic weapons. Moreover, Indian officials expect to be able to squeeze more out of the relationship with Russia as the Kremlin falters, just as India did after the fall of the Soviet Union, when the two countries formed the joint venture of BrahMos Aerospace. And they fear few repercussions for this course of action; Western countries have balked at penalizing India\u2019s decision to maintain ties with its old partner.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Some observers have suggested that India will back away from Russia because it is growing too close with\u2014even dependent on\u2014China<\/a>. But in contrast to their Western counterparts, Indian officials do not think that crushing sanctions will force Russia into China\u2019s arms because tensions persist in the Chinese-Russian relationship, including over Central Asia and the Arctic. In the view of Indian planners, India can be a wedge between Russia and China, allowing Moscow to retain some autonomy in its foreign policy and not settle for the role of junior partner to Beijing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n India\u2019s military depends on Russia for most of its combat and strike capabilities. The invasion of Ukraine<\/a> created a supply shock to the servicing of India\u2019s largely Russian arsenal by limiting or delaying access to spare parts and upgrades. India did not, however, take any drastic measures to accelerate the gradual diversification of its military equipment by cutting its use of Russian materiel and purchasing replacements. Although India remains concerned about the poor performance of some Russian weapons platforms, as well as its ability to access spare parts, it has no plans to rapidly overhaul its Russian weapons systems by turning to alternative foreign suppliers. With India\u2019s borders enjoying a modicum of stability after border crises in 2019 and 2020, Indian strategists can countenance lower operational readiness over the next few years, even if that means living with some vulnerability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the near to medium term, India plans to muddle through with existing stocks, drawing from the secondary market of Russian parts and leaning on its own domestic production of military equipment. It will work with Russia to fulfill outstanding delivery commitments and selectively pursue contracts with Western defense companies that bolster the indigenous Indian defense industry. In the long term, India wants to become largely self-sufficient in its defense needs and no longer be dependent on external suppliers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Even as India aims to diversify its arsenal and achieve self-sufficiency over the next 20 years, it will need Russia for several critical technologies. India\u2019s Sukhoi-30 fighter aircraft will remain the backbone of its air force for several decades but cannot be maintained or upgraded without crucial Russian contributions. India\u2019s most significant defense export\u2014the BrahMos antiship cruise missile currently marketed to Southeast Asian countries to deter China\u2014uses Russian propulsion technology. As long as the Kremlin controls critical elements of India\u2019s advanced weapons systems\u2014most notably India\u2019s fighter aircraft, cruise missiles, and submarines\u2014it wields considerable leverage over New Delhi.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Beyond these material considerations, some shared ideological orientations will keep India friendly with Russia. Indian and Russian officials espouse a \u201cpolycentric\u201d vision of global order, in which no single hegemon holds sway and great powers maintain their own spheres of influence. Both New Delhi and Moscow believe that such a basis for international order is more stable than one lorded over by one or two superpowers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Indian political elites also maintain an affinity for Russia rooted in decades of cooperation with the Soviet Union. Two months after the Russian invasion, Yoga Jyotsna, an Indian foreign policy scholar, suggested that in the opinion of members of \u201cthe armed forces and perceptive analysts, Russia stands number one as India\u2019s friend.\u201d Rajeswari Rajagopalan, a director at a major Indian think tank, has argued that \u201cthe strategic sympathy for the Soviets and Russia still continues not just among the political class but also . . . among the larger public\u201d because of the romanticization of historic Russian support for India. The Indian foreign policy establishment does not condone Russia\u2019s invasion, but seasoned officials advising the government on national security consider multiple parties\u2014including NATO<\/a>\u2014responsible for the current crisis and will not put all the blame on Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Indian public also sympathizes with Russia. A majority of Indians surveyed in a July poll refused to describe the Russian invasion of Ukraine as wrong. A September 2022 survey of over 1,000 Indian adults found that Indians blame the Russian invasion of Ukraine as much on the West as on Russia, and most do not believe that Russian victory would make the world more dangerous. Public attitudes in India diverge sharply not only from those in European countries and Australia and Japan but also from those in emerging markets such as Brazil and South Africa.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As Jacob and other analysts have suggested, the Indian-Russian relationship is on a long-term downward trend. But the transition will be slow. India\u2019s incremental distancing from Russia will only occur in a prolonged time frame, maybe decades, that provides little utility for U.S. policymakers to shape Russia\u2019s near-term decision-making. (The exception may be any Russian use of nuclear weapons that could shock New Delhi\u2019s calculus, although Indian diplomats see the likelihood of that escalation as \u201cminimal\u201d).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Despite India\u2019s abiding ties to Russia, its strategic partnership with the United States retains a compelling logic. India knows the United States stands out as the most important partner for its own economic and technological developments. Washington can still gain plenty from New Delhi\u2019s active cooperation. Western policymakers have bet big on India as the most important swing state in the international system to balance the rise of China and support a rules-based order. But India is more narrowly concerned with the Indo-Pacific balance of power. If U.S. policymakers can continue to count on India to meaningfully and visibly balance against China in its neighborhood, it will be easier for the United States to accept the costs of India\u2019s enduring partnership with a diminishing Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n SAMEER LALWANI is a Senior Expert with the Asia Center at the U.S. Institute of Peace and a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategy and Budgetary Assessments.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n I fear Sameer Lalwani is underestimating the tectonic shift underway. Last December, I went on a weeklong visit to Russia. I returned to New Delhi with the firm belief that while Russia and India may have few bilateral disagreements and are still fond of each other, structural factors and geopolitical complexities are already diminishing the strength of the relationship. Even many Russian analysts recognize that factors beyond the control of the two governments may further complicate the ties.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Moreover, what stood out to me from all the feedback I received in India on my original piece<\/a> in Foreign Affairs<\/em> last September was the near-consensus that concerns about China are encouraging Indian policymakers to steer away from Russia and that the Ukraine war is only accelerating that trend. The decades-old close partnership between India and Russia is no more, replaced with a transactional relationship that will likely grow ever more distant in the coming years.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Ukraine war marks perhaps the first time in recent years that India has had to make an uncomfortable choice between Russia and its U.S. and Western partners. That choice places an unexpected burden on Indian diplomacy and the country\u2019s policy of multi-alignment. New Delhi\u2019s ambivalent position at the outset of the war actually won it a lot of attention in the shape of high-level visits from Western powers and from Russia. But the diplomatic spotlight will not rest on India for long, and the systemic implications of this war for the country may be negative and far-reaching. For one, New Delhi will have less room to maneuver in a world divided into opposing camps. Second, the war\u2019s effect on global commodity prices is already hurting the Indian economy. This sobering reality is not lost on Indian policymakers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Yes, New Delhi continues to purchase cheap Russian oil and has devised methods for trading with Moscow that circumvent Western sanctions. But that is foreign policy opportunism born of sheer necessity. India will continue to maintain transactional ties with Russia and trade with the country. But it will also continue to move away from Russia in accordance with its grand strategy of hewing closer to the West to balance China.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Apart from defense-related trade, the bilateral relationship today has little ballast. As Pavan Kapoor, the Indian ambassador to Russia, pointed out last December, bilateral trade \u201chas become too one-sided\u201d in Russia\u2019s favor and therefore \u201cunsustainable.\u201d (Russian exports account for roughly two-thirds of trade between the two countries.) Political relations without strong economic underpinnings can only go so far.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But larger factors than bilateral trade suggest the downward trajectory of the relationship. China tops the list of concerns. Beijing is driving a wedge between Moscow and New Delhi. The closer China and Russia get, the more India will pursue other strategic partners.<\/p>\n\n\n\nFALSE DAWN<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
STAYING POWER<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
MUDDLING THROUGH<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
INDIA\u2019S NUMBER ONE FRIEND<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
AN UNCOMFORTABLE REALITY<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
JACOB REPLIES<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
UNEXPECTED BURDENS<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
HEADING SOUTH<\/h3>\n\n\n\n