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Palestinians, nations dismiss Trump’s one-sided deal

US President Donald Trump has presented his long-awaited Middle East peace plan, promising to keep Jerusalem as Israel’s undivided capital.

Trump’s initiative, whose principal author is his son-in-law Jared Kushner, follows a long line of efforts to resolve one of the world’s most intractable issues.

The 50-page political outline recognises Israeli sovereignty over major illegal settlement blocs in the occupied West Bank, something to which the Palestinians will almost certainly object. Trump said Israel would be granted security control of the Jordan Valley in the occupied West Bank.

Trump said Jerusalem will remain Israel’s “undivided capital”. But he also said under the plan, “eastern Jerusalem” would serve as a capital of a State of Palestine. He did not elaborate on what he meant by eastern Jerusalem. He later said on Twitter the a Palestinian capital could be in parts of “East Jerusalem”.

Trump had already recognised Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, moving the US embassy from Tel Aviv to the city.

Palestinian Response

Responding to the plan, the Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas said Jerusalem is not for sale; all our rights are not for sale and are not for bargain. “I say to Trump and Netanyahu: Jerusalem is not for sale, all our rights are not for sale and are not for bargain. And your deal, the conspiracy, will not pass,” he said in a televised address from Ramallah in the West Bank.

The chief of the Palestinian Hamas movement, Ismail Haniyeh, stated ‘we reject any agreement, deal or project that undermine the certain rights of the Palestinian people.’

Sami Abu Zhuri, a Hamas official, said Trump’s statement was aggressive and the Palestinians will confront this deal. ‘Jerusalem will remain a Palestinian land.’

International reactions
Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, emphasized that Jerusalem is sacred for Muslims and announced: Trump’s so-called peace plan proposing to leave Jerusalem to ‘Israel’ never acceptable.
Numan Kurtulmus, deputy chairman of Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AK), also slammed Trump’s statements on Jerusalem, saying: ‘No, Trump! Jerusalem is the capital of the Palestinian state and the heart of the Islamic world!’
The foreign minister of Iran, Javad Zarif, posted on Twitter: ‘the so-called “Vision for Peace” is simply the dream project of a bankruptcy-ridden real estate developer. But it is a nightmare for the region and the world. And, hopefully, a wake-up call for all the Muslims who have been barking up the wrong tree.’
In the far east,  the ministry of foreign affairs of Indonesia issued a statement suggesting that the issue of Palestine shall be resolved based on the principles of the “two-state solution” that respects international law and internationally agreed parameters.
Meanwhile, a spokesperson of China’s foreign ministry commented on the US proposal, saying: ‘We noted media reports on that and are studying this plan. We believe the Palestine issue should be resolved on the basis of relevant UN resolutions, the principles of “two-state solution” and “land for peace” and other international consensus, which should all be observed.’

Further escalation 

At least 41 people were wounded after the Israeli forces used rubber bullets and tear gas in the Jordan Valley, the Al-Orub refugee camp and Tulkarem, according to the Red Cross.

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas vowed popular mobilisations against the deal, as groups including the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) and Hamas, which has governed the occupied Gaza Strip since 2007, called for mass protests.

From: Agencies, AMEF

ICJ orders Myanmar to protect Rohingya

The Hague-based International Court of Justice has ordered Myanmar to take emergency measures to prevent genocide of the Rohingya.

In a unanimously-ruled order issued by a panel of 17 judges, and read by presiding Judge Abdulaqawi Ahmed Yusuf, the court upheld the provisions of the 1948 Genocide Convention – saying Myanmar had “caused irreparable damage to the rights of the Rohingya”.

According to the Statute of the ICJ, the court has the power to order provisional measures when “irreparable prejudice could be caused to rights which are the subject of judicial proceedings”. The court found that the condition of urgency had been met in this case.

In November the Gambia filed a suit against Myanmar alleging it was committing “an ongoing genocide against its minority Muslim Rohingya population” and violating the 1948 Genocide Convention.

Provisional measures are steps to take aimed at preventing further harm and comes as the first step in the legal case.

Judge Yusuf took care to emphasise the ordering of provisional measures did not “prejudge” the case. As Mike Becker, adjunct lecturer at Trinity College in Dublin and a former legal officer at the ICJ, emphasises: “This is a preliminary decision that is without prejudice to the merits of the case.”

Because of the gravity of the crimes of which Myanmar has been accused, Becker and other legal experts described the case as an “historic legal challenge”.

Urgent measures requested and ordered

In its application to the court, the Gambia requested six provisional measures requiring Myanmar to act “with immediate effect” to prevent further genocide of the Rohingya group and to take steps not to destroy or render inaccessible any evidence already described in the application.

The Gambia also urged both sides not to take any action which might aggravate the dispute or render it more difficult to resolve, and to provide a report to the court on implementing such measures.

The Gambia later also requested Myanmar cooperate with United Nations bodies that seek to investigate the alleged acts.

Judge Yusuf said the court was not constrained to ordering the measures requested by the Gambia and that it had the power to order additional measures. Yusuf further said that, in ordering provisional measures in this case, it was not necessary to decide on the question of the presence of genocidal intent, as claimed by Myanmar.

The court ordered Myanmar should take all measures within its power to prevent the commission of all acts within the scope of article two of the Genocide Convention. It particularly cited clause one – killing members of the group, clause two – causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group, clause three – deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its destruction in whole or in part, and clause four – imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group.

Myanmar must further ensure that its military does not commit genocide or attempts to commit genocide or conspires to commit genocide. Myanmar was also ordered to prevent the destruction of evidence and to ensure the preservation of evidence related to the alleged genocide.

‘Stunning rebuke of Aung San Suu Kyi’

In its application to the court, the Gambia asked for the measures to be implemented “with immediate effect”. In an unusual decision, the court requested the Gambia report to the court within four months after the order had been made, and every six months thereafter – until the final decision is made by the court.

Legal experts have applauded the court’s decision. Reed Brody, Commissioner at the International Commission of Jurists who was instrumental in the prosecution of Hissene Habre, said to Al Jazeera:  “This is a great day for the hundreds of thousands of Rohingyas who have been displaced, killed and raped. The UN’s highest court has recognised their suffering.”

Brody added: “There is still a long way to go before this order becomes reality and we see actual improvements in the lives of the Rohingya, but today this persecuted people will have a first taste of justice. This is further a stunning rebuke of Aung San Suu Kyi, especially after she went personally to The Hague to defend the actions of the Myanmar military. There will now be huge pressure on the court to comply with the government’s ruling.”

According to Gleider Hernandez, professor at Catholic University of Leuven, the ICJ has made clear that it intends to supervise the implementation of the judgement. He said “Though not unprecedented, the regularity with which Myanmar had to submit reports is striking.”

The ICJ’s orders are legally binding. Brody says the fact that the decision was unanimous will give additional weight to the court’s measures.

SOURCE: Al Jazeera

KL talks bring fresh hope for peace in southern Thailand

THE first formal meeting between Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (BRN) and the Thai government in Kuala Lumpur (KL) yesterday has brought fresh hope for peace in Thailand’s violence-wracked deep south.

Anas Abdulrahman, the head of BRN’s delegation at the talk, said after going through back channels for a long time, the two parties finally reached common ground that negotiations were the best way forward towards resolving the armed conflict in the Muslim-majority provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and Songkhla in southern Thailand.

According to him, for several years, both sides had worked hard to arrive at a negotiation format which now has resulted in a working framework and ToR (terms of reference) that will be utilised in resolving the conflict in a dignified way and make it real and sustainable.

“The framework and ToR will be the guide in the negotiation process which is based on honesty and sincerity,” he told a media conference in Petaling Jaya, Selangor, yesterday.

The Jan 20 meeting was the first round of official talks between the BRN and Thai government. The Thai side was headed by General Wanlop Rugsanaoh. The facilitator was former Inspector-General of Police Tan Sri Abdul Rahim Mohd Noor, representing the Malaysian government.

“The talks this time were to formalise commitments from both sides as confidence-building measures, so that they can continue as had been agreed earlier.

“These include Malaysia remaining as the facilitator. The talks yesterday were also attended by foreign observers,” said Anas.

Asked when the next round of talks will take place, he said he leaves it to the facilitator to arrange it.

An insurgency began in the deep south in 2004, and has claimed about 7,000 lives. Prior to this, BRN’s only formal contact with the Thai government was through Mara Pattani, an umbrella body representing various groups in southern Thailand, where it was represented by its political wing.

These groups are seeking secession from Buddhist-majority Thailand, but Malaysia has stated that independence is out of the question and that at the most, they may get some form of autonomy.

From: The Malaysian Reserve/ Bernama

Opinion: how Asean can build bridges

By George Yeo

Regional trade and investment in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) cannot be discussed without reference to the larger world. From the earliest days, the people of Southeast Asia have been in continuous interaction with those of East Asia, South Asia and beyond.

That larger world is again in flux. Facing the prospect of a competing superpower in China, the

United States now defines its national interest in narrower terms. Many Americans no longer see the post-World War II multilateral institutions which were established under US leadership as serving US interests unless they are radically reformed.

For example, the US is increasingly unwilling to accept China’s designation as a developing country. Since China joined the World Trade Organisation in November 2001, its GDP has grown six times in purchasing power parity terms, eight times in RMB terms and 10 times in USD terms. With a per capita income of US$10,000, China is still a developing country but in some sectors, China is already highly developed.

Under President Donald Trump, the US is forcing a certain decoupling of the global economy. This will have huge implications for all of us. Geoeconomics and geopolitics are always intertwined. Decoupling is never economic alone. Provided it does not lead to war, decoupling can, however, open up new opportunities for Asean.

DECOUPLING

It is ironic that China has now become the strongest advocate of globalisation. With a large, relatively homogenous population spread over a vast country, Chinese leaders have always been preoccupied with domestic challenges. But despite its reform and the opening up of its economy, China will never allow itself to be fully exposed to foreign influence.

In contrast, the US saw itself as an open society and wanted the rest of the world to couple itself to it. Many Americans believed, with the best of intentions, that China would eventually become more like America. Realising now that this is unlikely to happen, and fuelled by a growing sense of insecurity, the US is making a fundamental reassessment of how it views itself in relation to China and the rest of the world.

We in Asean should therefore expect the coming years to be fraught. American diplomats today openly bad-mouth China and pressure us – sometimes openly, sometimes subtly – to make a choice between them and China. It puts us in an intolerable position.

ASEAN’S RESPONSE

China is now the top trading partner of every Asean country. It is a major investor, an important source of tourists and a growing market. No one in Southeast Asia will lightly choose the US over China. Worse, any member state which takes a position hostile to China must expect a commensurate Chinese response.

At the same time, no member state wants to be too dependent on China either. All of us in Asean want China’s friendship but fear China’s dominance. Our instinct is therefore to diversify. We want our account with China to grow because that is good for our people but at the same time we want our other accounts to grow in tandem.

Japan understands this and positions itself in Asean as an additional and, in some ways, a superior partner. We should work hard to persuade the US that this too is the best stance for it to take in Southeast Asia.

Asean should therefore be friendly to all major powers and maintain strict strategic neutrality. This is not a static position. Sometimes, to achieve balance, we may have to lean further in one direction or another but the overall objective is always to maintain balance. In addition to the US, China and Japan, we should also strength our links to Europe and India. It is easier for us to find manoeuvring space in a multipolar world.

ASEAN UNITY

All this is only possible if the 10 member states are united. Political words alone are hollow if they are not matched by economic and social reality. As a credible political grouping, Asean is only as strong as its economic integration.

Physical connectivity within Asean and between Asean and the rest of the world is improving year by year but not fast enough. Border crossings are easier but not efficient enough.

Non-tariff barriers have increased and are a major source of friction. We need greater coherence and better coordination in the setting of standards and regulations. The cost of logistics in archipelagic Southeast Asia is still much too high.

The Asean Economic Community needs a fresh political push to seize the opportunities which decoupling has brought to our doorsteps.

ASEAN OPPORTUNITY

In the last two years, many multinational corporations (MNCs) have come under great stress because of the US-China trade war. Many companies in China – both local and international – are seeking to domicile outside China to be free of US sanctions. For many US companies, China is a larger market or potential market than the US. Some will want to decouple from the US. Capital naturally flows to where the returns are highest and the risks are least.

Asean countries are good alternative production bases for global MNCs which are reassessing their supply chain configurations. Each of us is more competitive if we are able to take advantage of the combined strengths of Asean.

Vietnam is a major beneficiary but is already facing rising costs, partly due to a lack of qualified manpower and inadequate logistics. If Laos and Cambodia become part of the equation, more and higher-quality investments will flow into Vietnam. The border crossings between Thailand and Myanmar need to be improved so that their combined comparative advantages can be brought into full play.

In archipelagic Southeast Asia, relaxation of cabotage can lower logistics costs significantly and energise the economies of otherwise isolated island groups.

I would like to propose as a conceptual idea the establishment of Asean free trade zones (FTZs) and Associated Border Crossings, so the MNCs which investments we are seeking will see Asean as a whole and not just as separate parts. We can start by concentrating on relatively simple manufacturing. In a small way, we already have an illustration in the Asean immigration lanes at airports.

ASEAN CONNECTIVITY

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) offers us a golden opportunity to revamp the connectivity map of Asean. Those of us who visit China regularly can see how highways, high-speed rail and airports have enabled hundreds of millions of people to join the global economy and be lifted out of poverty. We should have similar ambitions for Southeast Asia.

Infrastructural development has big network benefits and needs an Asean-wide perspective. It is right that we worry about the cost-benefit of specific projects and our ability to service debt. Asean should engage China on the BRI and bring in others like the Asian Development Bank, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and World Bank to work with us. This will help overcome the concern of some Asean countries that they may become too dependent on China. We should of course welcome the participation of other countries like Japan, Korea, Australia and the US.

VIETNAM’S CHAIRMANSHIP OF ASEAN

Vietnam’s assumes its chairmanship of Asean in a critical year with exciting possibilities for Asean, and is well-qualified to provide the necessary leadership. No one can accuse Vietnam of being too close to either China, with which it has a historical love-hate relationship, or the US, with which it fought a long, brutal war to achieve national independence. Vietnam’s economy has also taken off, benefiting from strong economic fundamentals, the reform measures of recent years and the outflow of investments from China.

For the economic agenda to make good progress, the political and social agendas must be complementary. It is imperative to bring calm to the South China Sea and transform it from a zone of competing claims to one of cooperation. Whether the Code of Conduct (COC) between Asean and China can be signed in Brunei next year depends a great deal on the progress made this year under Vietnam’s chairmanship. No country can abandon its territorial claim but all of us can work towards greater economic cooperation. Dialling down the temperature will spur cooperation. Promoting peace and stability in this strategic waterway benefits all users.

Historically, the South China Sea has been the link between Southeast Asia and China, Korea and Japan. The Sea connected us; it never divided us. An idea for Asean to consider is the incorporation of all or part of Hainan Island into a South China Sea economic cooperation area once the COC is in place. This is not difficult to achieve because China has already designated Hainan as an FTZ. It is already a separate customs area.

PARTNERSHIPS

To limit the negative effects of decoupling, Asean should work hard to strengthen regional economic arrangements and partnerships with major economies. On the CPTPP (Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for the Trans-Pacific Partnership), we should work to bring the remaining Asean countries – Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar – into the CPTPP. This is important to maintain Asean centrality. Second, we should encourage China to join the CPTPP. This will put pressure on the US to rejoin. We should contrive it such that both China and the US join at the same time. With China and the US in, the CPTPP will cover some two thirds of the global economy and pull the WTO along. Such a CPTPP will prevent decoupling from going too far and help avert any slide into war.

It is not good that India has temporarily opted out from the RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership). We can understand India’s reasons because the Indian economy is going through a rough patch. India will always be an important Asean partner. We should also begin the process of negotiating a free-trade agreement with the European Union. European MNCs are similarly affected by decoupling and are looking at Asean as an alternative to China. The more we are able to strengthen intra-Asean trade and investment, the greater our attractiveness to Europeans too.

For the social agenda, we need Vietnam to give a further push to Asean’s joint bid for the Soccer World Cup in 2034. Preparation for it will capture the imagination of a younger generation of Asean citizens. No other country in Asean celebrates soccer victories the way Vietnam does.

The views belong to the author.

From: South China Morning Post

Opinion: What Happened to India

By Shashi Tharoor

The India the world once celebrated – the world’s fastest-growing free-market liberal democracy – seems to be giving way to a violent, intolerant, illiberal autocracy. It is a turn that was long in the making, reflecting the impact of eight major factors on the country’s society and politics.

It’s a question I hear increasingly these days. International news media report on repression in Kashmir, mounting Hindu chauvinism, widespread protests against new laws, assaults on women, and more. The India the world once celebrated – the world’s fastest-growing free-market liberal democracy – seems to be giving way to a violent, intolerant, illiberal autocracy.

The reports are true, and the picture they paint is not a pretty one. But India’s well-wishers should not give up on the country. The democratic opposition is fighting back, buoyed by the support of young people protesting spontaneously, and not at the behest of any political party, against the excesses of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government. Democracy has deep roots in India, and it will not collapse without a fight from the country’s many independent institutions and politically aware citizens.

India’s current predicament is the culmination of three decades of evolving trends in Indian politics. Eight stand out.

First, there have been the social consequences of deepening democracy. Viewed by many observers as a fragile transplant at independence in 1947, democracy has become deeply entrenched, empowering previously marginalized castes and communities. Thanks to the implementation of the Mandal Commission proposal in 1989 to provide “reservations,” or quotas, in government jobs, universities, and the like to the “Other Backward Classes” (such set-asides already existed for Dalits, once outcastes, and tribals, India’s aboriginal people), the former underclass has become a potent political force. Three generations of political empowerment, including of people with modest educational attainment, Hindi mother tongue, and small-town backgrounds, ended the dominance of the urban, anglophone elite that had established liberal secularism as India’s ruling ethos. A different mentality now prevails in power.

Second, there has been a backlash against cultural globalization. India, like Turkey and the United States, has witnessed growing resentment of cosmopolitan secular elites, with their Westernized lifestyles and perception of themselves as global citizens. Indian social conservatism shuddered at the breakdown of social and sexual mores, depicted in films and television shows. Traditionalists recoiled at women going to work, dressed in jeans and other non-Indian clothing, returning home late at night after shifts in call centers attuned to Western business hours, freed from the bonds and the bounds of local social custom.

Third, there has been a revolt against the political insider class. The denizens of “Lutyens’ Delhi,” shorthand for the government enclave in the heart of the capital where the high and mighty lived, were seen by their challengers as corrupt, complacent, inefficient, and resistant to change. The first decade of the twenty-first century was marked by a growing rejection of all they stood for, including liberalism, secularism, political “insider trading,” and sub-optimal governance. This sentiment was captured in the 2011 protests of the Gandhian leader Anna Hazare. The protesters’ demand that the country be cleansed of its corrupted ruling class contributed significantly to Modi’s victory in 2014.

Fourth, the liberalization of the statist Indian economy from 1991 onwards, in response to global market realities, led to the empowerment of an increasingly wealthy business community that was anxious to see more obstacles removed and rent-seekers eliminated, and willing to finance political change to make it happen. Modi and the BJP benefited from this, too, not least in generous funding from the capitalist nouveaux riches.

Fifth, the worldwide phenomenon of increasing religiosity over the last quarter-century found its counterpart in Hindutva revivalism. Partly this was in reaction to the propagation of Wahhabi/Salafi theology in shiny new Saudi-financed mosques. As Indian Muslims, too, began more consciously to identify with the global Muslim umma, they began to redefine their Islam in ways that alienated them more visibly from Hindus.

In parallel, a greater Hindu consciousness was abetted by the popularity of television serializations of the Ramayana and Mahabharata epics; concerns about “Muslim appeasement” following such steps as a law overturning a Supreme Court ruling that would have awarded alimony to a divorced Muslim woman; and the popularity of a BJP-led initiative to replace a sixteenth-century mosque, the Babri Masjid, which most Hindus believed stood on one of their holiest sites, the Ram Janmabhoomi, or birthplace of the Hindu god Rama. All this helped the spread of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh or RSS, the khaki-shorts-wearing stormtroopers of Hindu chauvinism, who brought ideological clarity and organizational heft to inchoate Hindu resentment. The BJP’s growth from the mid-1980s followed on the coattails of the RSS.

Sixth, this rise in Hindu consciousness occurred at a time when Muslim Pakistan stepped up its campaign of inciting, financing, and carrying out terrorism in India. Support for militancy in Kashmir gave way to outright military aggression, such as the attempt to seize the heights of Kargil, from which Pakistani troops were repulsed after a short but bloody war in 1999. Growing hostility to Pakistan, and the repeated failure of attempts to make peace with it, intensified Hindus’ belief that they were being targeted.

Seventh, India is the world’s youngest major country, with 65% of the population under 35. Young Indians are impatient for change and progress, tired of the old politics (especially the messy coalitions that reigned from 1989 to 2014 and the political oscillations they embodied), and want India to be self-confident, assertive, and ready to take on the world. Modi’s strutting confidence spoke to these desires.

Finally, social media have become ubiquitous, with platforms like Twitter, Facebook, and WhatsApp serving as major influencers and recyclers of prejudice. Social media reinforce people’s worst beliefs by exposing them to prejudices they might not have dared to express in the past, but that now no longer seem rare and disreputable. Suddenly, bigotry became respectable, and animosity toward Muslims, previously concealed under a veneer of civility, became an electoral asset.

All of this came to a head when the moment found its messenger: Modi, charismatic orator of unchallengeable Hindutva credentials, tough and efficient Chief Minister of Gujarat, marketed by a skilled campaign manager and Svengali, Amit Shah, as a no-nonsense administrator who would preside over economic growth. India was primed to receive Modi’s message and elected the BJP in 2014 and 2019. We are living with the consequences now, but these eight factors explain how we got there.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author.

From: Project Syndicate

Opinion: The Israelization of US foreign policy

By Daoud Kuttab

The foreign policy of the US during the three years of the Donald Trump administration has undergone a slow change. It has gradually departed from international norms and carried out clear violations of the legal and ethical standards the country had previously championed.
While some of these changes can be clearly identified as pro-Israel in the Middle East conflict, other policies that have no direct relation with Israel appear to have adopted both the style and the justifications that Tel Aviv has often used to defend its actions that are contrary to international laws and norms.
The Trump administration began by flouting international resolutions that specifically called on UN member states not to move their embassies to Jerusalem until a political resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict had been found. That December 2018 decision was in direct violation of the 1980 UN Security Council resolution 478, which called on all members not to recognize Israel’s unilateral  annexation of occupied East Jerusalem and asked members with missions in Jerusalem “to withdraw their diplomatic missions from the city.” Washington adopted the Israeli justification by claiming that its move was merely recognition of the reality on the ground. Furthermore, US officials, including Trump’s special envoy to the Middle East Jason Greenblatt, went on a public campaign calling on all UN member states to follow America’s act, in violation of the UN Security Council resolution.
America’s Israelization continued by its abrupt refusal to accept that the Palestinian territories are “occupied” — again in violation of UN resolutions and decisions by the International Court of Justice in The Hague. The Trump administration followed that by giving legitimacy to illegal Israeli settlements built in occupied territories in violation of the Geneva Convention.
The process of Israelization, however, was not limited to Palestine, but also included other occupied territories. The US’ decision to recognize Israel’s illegal annexation of the Syrian Golan Heights violated, for the first time, an international post-Second World War understanding that it is unacceptable to acquire land by war. This mistaken precedent clears the way for countries throughout the world to potentially start settling their differences with their neighbors through military aggression, rather than negotiations and the rule of law.

Perhaps the US’ most recent violation of international humanitarian law was the decision to assassinate an Iranian official on sovereign Iraqi land, which was followed up by threats to bomb 52 historic and cultural sites in Iran — another clear war crime according to international law.
In all these acts, the Trump administration has repeated a number of often-used Israeli justifications, which range from accepting the reality on the ground to insisting an action was a pre-emptive defensive move in order to counter undeclared possible future threats.
All these actions that mimic what Israel does in the region are done without any backing from the UN or its important Security Council. As has been the case with Israel, actions without international backing turn the region into a jungle, where might is right.
The Israelis have for decades been allowed by the international community, including the US, to flout the rule of law and international norms. What is new in the past three years is that Washington has not only departed from its previous public denunciations of clear Israeli violations, but has adopted the Israeli policy itself and used it to justify its own actions in various parts of the world.
The outcome of such a change is not limited to the US or the Middle East. It provides a green light to military powers throughout the world to resolve their problems with their opponents using unrestricted military power. This was made clear by a headline in an Indian newspaper, which called for an assassination campaign against Pakistani military officers it considers supportive of terrorism using America’s (and by extension Israel’s) policy that the ends justify the means.
After the end of the Second World War, the civilized the world met and agreed on a set of understandings that were aimed at avoiding the use of military action to resolve disputes between countries and peoples. America, the home of the UN and the UN Security Council, was seen for years as the most important protector and defender of this basic international understanding. However, recent years have shown that not only is Israel being given a pass on its violations of international laws and understandings, but its actions have become a model for demagogic leaders in America, India, the Philippines and other countries, which prefer to flex their military might to solve their problems. These violations must not be allowed to become the norm around the world; otherwise we will be paving the way for another global catastrophe.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author 

From: Arab News

Opinion: Why Hamas wants Palestinian elections to be held

By: Dr Mohammad Makram Balawi

In September last year, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas declared at the UN that he is calling for an election to be held in Palestine. The aim is to elect 132 members of the Palestinian Legislative Council which was, according to many experts, dissolved unconstitutionally by Abbas on 22 December 2018. Although the rule of the court appointed by Abbas is that the PLC election should be held within six months of the previous Council’s dissolution, it took him nine months to express his intention. According to the law, the poll should be held 90 days from the date of the presidential declaration.

Abbas is 85 years old and has been President of the Palestinian Authority since 15 January 2005. Since his statement at the UN he has been busy consulting Palestinian factions on how to organise the election and where. As with the 2006 elections — the last to be held — only those Palestinians who live in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Jerusalem are expected to vote, disenfranchising more than 50 per cent of the Palestinian people; that is, those who live in the diaspora. Although many Palestinians demand that a presidential election should follow the legislative vote, it is not yet confirmed if Abbas agrees to that or not. His term of office actually expired in 2009.

PA spokespeople have said that the election is to renew the legitimacy of the Palestinian government and strengthen democracy, yet Abbas chose only to dissolve and organise an election for the PLC, which was dominated by his political opponents in 2006 when Hamas won 57.6 per cent of the seats. It is said that Abbas had to make this declaration under pressure from his European sponsors, but he is not really concerned with elections because, other than his unwillingness to make his position as president a point for discussion, he does not have enough unity within his own faction, Fatah, and that might fuel more internal differences if elections are conducted.

Moreover, an opinion poll conducted by the PSR on 17 December shows that Abbas has lost the support of the majority of the people. This comes as no surprise, due to the PA’s broken promises which prevent it from achieving independence; the high level of corruption; security coordination with the Israeli occupation; the failure to face Israel’s annexation of Jerusalem and the annexation of what is left of the West Bank, which is supposed to be the promised Palestinian state; and the feeling among Palestinians generally that Abbas represents an incompetent and aging leadership for an overwhelmingly young nation.

Many analysts argue that Abbas did not want to object to Europe’s election demands, so he hoped that either Hamas or Israel would refuse to accept them, and save him from embarrassment in front of his European friends. To his surprise, when he dispatched the Chairman of the Central Elections Commission, Dr Hanna Nasir, to the Gaza Strip, Hamas and other Palestinian factions endorsed his election call almost unconditionally.

The agreement included one condition that will be refused by the Israelis, though, which is to allow Palestinian Jerusalemites to vote within their city. This condition was put by the PA and almost all of the factions in order to stress the Palestinian right to Jerusalem and the unity of the Palestinian people. Israel, which is keen to stress the Jewish and Israeli identity of the occupied Holy City, cannot allow Palestinian elections in Jerusalem. Insisting on this condition, therefore, will almost certainly mean that there will be no elections after all.

It is said that Abbas will not be the only one to benefit from this, because Hamas will as well. According to this argument, the de facto government in the Gaza Strip will not risk losing its authority in the territory to an elected government, which basically ignores the fact that the movement won the 2006 elections fairly and squarely. Hence, Hamas outsmarted Abbas by accepting his call for elections, almost unconditionally, because the movement knows that he and his movement are not in a good position to fight a PLC election, and even if Israel agrees to allow Palestinians to vote in Jerusalem, Abbas will eventually find some reason to abandon the process.

There are, though, other reasons to make me believe that Hamas needs this election. The most important of these is the Israeli blockade imposed on the Gaza Strip for the past 13 years which has destroyed the infrastructure and imposed unimaginable pressure on the public to the extent of making Gaza an “unliveable” place. Compounding the problems are the high rate of unemployment; the chronic shortage of medicines; the difficulty of movement outside the enclave; repeated Israeli military offensives and incursions; and pollution. The strategy of the blockade is to make the people in Gaza rise up against Hamas, but it has failed miserably in this respect.

Nevertheless, the blockade has made the life of the Palestinians in Gaza tragic and kept Hamas — which is basically a liberation movement, remember — busy in trying to solve everyday problems and thus distracted from its main mission. Governing people under an international embargo is no picnic, as Hamas discovered after it won the elections in 2006. That is why the movement actually handed over the government to Fatah in 2017, which was supposed to be followed by parliamentarian and presidential elections, but they have never materialised.

The second important reason why Hamas needs this and other elections to be held is the complete conviction prevalent among its rank and file that for geographic and strategic reasons, liberation cannot be done from Gaza alone, regardless of how strong it becomes. It has to be led from the West Bank. Due to security cooperation between the Israeli occupation and the Palestinian Authority, though, Hamas’s ability to address the public, let alone carry out major resistance operations, has declined drastically. The movement is thus hopeful that the results of the anticipated election could bring a more pro-resistance Palestinian Legislative Council, or at least could harness the PA’s security cooperation with the occupation and provide a better environment for national work.

If a presidential election is also held, then it would be a golden chance for Hamas to get rid of Abbas and his legacy; from the Islamic movement’s perspective, anybody would be a better Palestinian President than Abbas. If not, and only the PLC election is conducted, then even if Hamas does not win in the West Bank and Gaza, nobody will venture to disarm the Palestinian factions in Gaza, as Hamas and other factions have declared their opposition to such a move. According to this calculus, therefore, if the election is held, Hamas will emerge a winner, even if it does not win a single seat in the Palestinian parliament.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author.

Iran pulls back from nuclear deal as Middle East tensions rise

Iran said on Sunday it would no longer abide by any of its commitments to the 2015 nuclear accord the country signed with world powers, signaling the deal’s collapse as the fallout from the U.S. killing of a top Iranian commander intensified.

Iranian state television quoted a government statement as saying that Tehran would not abide by the limitations on the number of centrifuges used for enrichment, its stockpiles of enriched uranium or its nuclear research and development.

The announcement came hours after hundreds of thousands of Iranians gathered in Mashhad, Iran’s holiest city, to mourn Qassem Soleimani, who was killed by U.S. airstrikes in Baghdad on Friday.

His assassination dramatically escalated the brewing standoff between the U.S. and Iran and has heightened tensions across the region. Tehran has vowed to respond.

President Donald Trump warned over the weekend that the U.S. had identified 52 targets, including cultural sites in the Islamic Republic, that he said it would “hit very fast and very hard” if Tehran retaliated over the killing.

Trump, who has faced criticism from Democratic lawmakers who complained that Congress was not notified before the strike on Soleimani, signaled on Sunday that he was poised to respond swiftly to any Iranian retaliation.

“These Media Posts will serve as notification to the United States Congress that should Iran strike any U.S. person or target, the United States will quickly & fully strike back, & perhaps in a disproportionate manner,” the president tweeted.

Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran’s foreign minister, said Sunday that a red line had been crossed: “Those masquerading as diplomats and those who shamelessly sat to identify Iranian cultural & civilian targets should not even bother to open a law dictionary. Jus cogens refers to peremptory norms of international law, i.e. international red lines. That is, a big(ly) ‘no no’.”

Zarif tweeted later Sunday that, as the final remedial step of the nuclear deal, “there will no longer be any restriction on number of centrifuges.”

“This step is within [the nuclear agreement] & all 5 steps are reversible upon EFFECTIVE implementation of reciprocal obligations,” the post read.

The Islamic regime has steadily increased its atomic activity since Trump withdrew the U.S. from the accord in 2018 and imposed sanctions on Tehran.

Iran’s announcement on Sunday fell short of a total withdrawal from the accord. The country said it would continue cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the nuclear watchdog monitoring the agreement.

But Tehran’s decision to stop abiding by any of the deal’s commitments will increase fears about the risks of a regional arms race and dash any lingering hopes among European powers of keeping the accord alive.

While the European signatories — France, the U.K. and Germany — share Washington’s concerns about Iran’s support for regional militias and the development of its missile program, they did not support Trump’s decision to withdraw from the nuclear deal or impose crippling sanctions on the republic. The so-called E3 have been battling to keep the deal alive and have sought means to counter the American sanctions, keeping open an important diplomatic channel with Tehran.

But Iran’s announcement on Sunday will make it harder for them to continue supporting the accord. Under the deal, Tehran agreed to limit its nuclear activity in return for the economic benefits of many sanctions being lifted. Since Trump pursued his “maximum pressure” strategy against the republic, Iran’s oil exports have plummeted from about 2.8 million barrels a day in May to less than 500,000.

John Bolton, Trump’s former national security adviser and renowned Iran hawk, greeted the news with gusto. “Another good day,” he tweeted on Sunday. “Iran rips the mask off the idea it ever fully complied with the nuclear deal, or that it made a strategic decision to forswear nuclear weapons.”

The U.S. should now focus on “preventing the ayatollahs from getting such a capability,” he said.

The announcement Sunday on Iranian TV said the country would return to its commitments if the U.S. lifted its sanctions, reiterating Tehran’s longstanding position.

“This may initiate a nuclear crisis,” said Suzanne Maloney, a former State Department adviser on Iran who is now at the Brookings Institution. “They can’t march to a bomb tomorrow, but this will dramatically change the dynamic, and they can reduce the timeline.”

In a further sign of the repercussions from the killing of Soleimani, Iraqi lawmakers voted on Sunday in support of Baghdad expelling American troops from the country.

The resolution is not binding, but it underscores the backlash in Iraq triggered by the U.S. strikes that killed Soleimani and a powerful Iraqi militia leader.

“Ending the presence of foreign forces is preferable,” Adel Abdul Mahdi, Iraq’s caretaker prime minister, told parliament on Sunday, “despite the internal and external difficulties that might arise.”

In his speech, Mahdi also revealed that Iraq had been acting as a mediator to defuse tensions between Tehran and Washington, with Trump asking him to convey messages to Iran. Mahdi said that Soleimani had been in Baghdad as part of those diplomatic efforts, saying the commander had “a message to me from the Iranian side, in response to the Saudi message that we sent to the Iranians.”

Saudi Arabia is Iran’s main regional rival and a supporter of Trump’s maximum pressure strategy against the Islamic republic. But there have been signs that Riyadh wants to ease tensions with Tehran in the wake of a missile and drone attack that struck the kingdom’s oil infrastructure in September, temporarily knocking out half of Saudi Arabia’s crude output.

The expulsion of the estimated 5,000 troops in Iraq would be a damaging blow to Washington and severely undermine the international coalition fighting ISIS. The coalition on Sunday said it had suspended counterterror operations to focus on protecting its own troops.

“By killing Soleimani, without a thought to the consequences, the U.S. has opened the door to the expulsion of their troops and the ceding of Iraq to even greater Iranian influence,” said Toby Dodge, a Middle East expert at the London School of Economics.

The U.S. and Iran have been the dominant powers in Iraq since the 2003 American-led invasion that toppled Saddam Hussein.

“[W]e want to stay on in Iraq,” a senior State Department official told reporters ahead of the vote. “We have an important mission there.”

When asked about the Iraqi parliamentary vote, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo told Fox News that the Trump administration was “confident that the Iraqi people want the United States to continue to be there to fight the counterterror campaign.”

“We’ll have to take a look at what we do when the Iraqi leadership and government makes a decision,” he said.

From: Financial Times

Malaysia, Indonesia on course to become developed nations

By: Mohd Shukri Ishak

 The curtain lifts on 2020, promising closer ties between Malaysia and Indonesia, with both countries aspiring to achieve the developed nation status by 2030 and 2045 respectively.

The close relationship between two top leaders, Prime Minister Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad and President Joko Widodo, is certainly on a sound footing to serve the common interests of both countries in the new decade.

Indonesia’s plan to move its capital from Jakarta to Kalimantan will potentially spread prosperity to Sabah and Sarawak, too.

On Aug 26, 2019, Jokowi announced that the new capital of Indonesia would be moved to Kalimantan, or to be precise to Penajam Paser Utara and Kutai Kertanegara, covering an area of 180 hectares.

Work on the construction of the new capital is scheduled to begin this year (2020) and be completed by 2024.

Indonesia’s new capital should be seen as a great opportunity for Malaysia, particularly Sabah and Sarawak to jointly share the new economic opportunities.

Regarding the border, Malaysia and Indonesia will also renew the memorandum of understanding (MoU) in 2020 in respect to matters relating to security, control and cooperation in dealing with border crime issues.

During a visit by Home Minister Tan Sri Muhyiddin Yassin to Indonesia in December 2019, he met several Indonesian ministers, to discuss issues of mutual interest.

Among the agreements reached were the use of technologies such as drones to control the borders of Malaysia and Indonesia in the border areas of Kalimantan and Sabah as well as Sarawak, to address the issue of illegal immigrants and agreeing to establish a joint development area for the fishing industry in the area of overlapping territorial waters of both countries.

Basically, bilateral relations between the two countries are at an all-time high, with the close relationship between Dr Mahathir and Jokowi.

Indonesia was the first Asean country that Dr Mahathir visited after winning the 2018 general election while Malaysia was the first country Jokowi visited following his victory in the 2019 presidential election.

The visits demonstrated that nothing can stand in the way of bilateral relations, even the transboundary haze and clash between football fans of both countries during the 2022 World Cup and Asian Cup 2023 Qualifiers.

On the haze caused by forest and plantation fires in Indonesia that affected Malaysia in August and September last year, Indonesian National Disaster Management Agency chief Doni Monardo said Indonesia had done everything it could to address the issue including being persistent in carrying out fire-fighting operations, preventing and taking action against individuals or companies that knowingly conduct open burning.

The government of Indonesia has also expressed appreciation to Malaysia for helping the country in times of natural disasters.

On the football issue, quoting the secretary-general of the Indonesian Football Association, Ratu Tisha Destria, We all know how great the Japanese football supporters are who cleaned up the stadium although their team lost in the World Cup 2018… but, when we lost even though it was only in the qualifying round, don’t talk about cleaning the garbage, instead even throwing it at the opponents … “.

Indonesian Ambassador to Malaysia, Rusdi Kirana, in an interview with Malaysian media in Aug 2019 said the two countries should set aside competing with each other as well as ignore trivial matters and should instead focus on becoming developed nations.

“It’s time for us to take advantage of the similarities between us and not look for differences,” he said.

In Oct 2019, Tun Dr Mahathir launched the Shared Prosperity Vision 2030 (WKB2030) roadmap to accelerate Malaysia’s transformation into a new Asian Tiger. While Jokowi has the vision to see Garuda (Indonesia) soar as a developed nation by 2045.

In his first speech after being appointed as President for 2019-2024, Jokowi aimed to increase Indonesia’s per capita income to Rp27 million a month (about RM8,100) and Gross Domestic Product of US$7 trillion.

By comparison, in 2018, Indonesia’s GDP exceeded US$1 trillion, while Malaysia’s was about US$350 billion.

May Indonesia and Malaysia continue to prosper together.

Opinion: Vietnam’s 2020 strategy: a year of diplomatic force-multipliers

By:MICHAEL NGUYEN

Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc’s raising of the ASEAN gavel last month signalled not only Vietnam’s commencement as chair of the regional grouping, but also the start of a critically definitive period for its foreign policy in the South China Sea.

2020 is set to be a busy year for Vietnam, with several force multipliers for its foreign policy. Beyond its chairmanship of ASEAN’s Vision 2020 goals – predominantly stability in the region – Hanoi will also balance a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council and potential international legal action against Beijing. While such diplomatic responsibilities come with significant pressure, the opportune timing provides Hanoi a chance to engage the international community in its maritime security interests.

Tactical diplomacy is neither simple nor straightforward. As Prime Minister Hun Sen of Cambodia has warned, ASEAN is not a regional judicial body, and many scholars have often criticised the inefficient need for consensus to the extent that some doubt the organisations’ practical utility.

Yet these views overlook upcoming circumstances.

2020 will be dominated by negotiations regarding the Code of Conduct for the South China Sea before its proposed adoption in 2022. As chair, Hanoi will represent ASEAN with external parties – predominately Beijing – and is likely to be more aggressive compared to the previous chairs who were either non-claimants or reluctant to antagonize Beijing.

Additionally, 2020 will be the first full year for the ASEAN Outlook for the Indo-Pacific. Aimed at counterbalancing the Beijing-Washington power competition, it is ASEAN’s own brokering of the strategic environment. Here, Vietnam will undoubtedly stress its reference to “freedom of navigation” to their advantage, much to the satisfaction of Washington.

Nevertheless, these do not detract from the hurdles Hanoi will face as ASEAN chair.

Similar to 2012 and 2016, there is a likelihood Cambodia will block ASEAN statements to defend its alliance with Beijing. Hanoi, though having made inroads with Phnom Penh, is unlikely to have tilted this balance.

Moreover, as analysts have noted, negotiations regarding the Code of Conduct (COC) are inherently difficult because of undefined geography, disagreements towards dispute settlement or conflict resolution, and, most importantly, the undefined and unlikely legal status of the COC. Ultimately, this search for legality is Hanoi’s biggest hurdle, given the collective doubt that Beijing would ever agree to a legal document limiting its consolidation of control.

One alternative suggestion has been for Vietnam to use its seat on the UNSC, given the council’s foremost legal standing and enforceability mechanisms. However, as any political cynic recognises, Hanoi’s UNSC seat will inevitably be confined to megaphone diplomacy rather than any realistic resolution.

A more pragmatic legal approach, and one that could in fact be complimented by megaphone diplomacy, is international arbitration.

Though commonly speculated about as a strategy by analysts and scholars, Hanoi had previously remained quiet about its position toward this option. This was until last month, when Deputy Foreign Minister Le Hoai Trung confirmed that Hanoi was considering using mechanisms within the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

Such “lawfare” is a risky strategy. China will certainly reject the ruling, irrespective of the verdict, on the same basis as its rejection of the 2016 Philippines South China Sea arbitration decision and its likely rejection of a legally enforceable Code of Conduct. Beijing is also guaranteed to retaliate, with Hanoi risking economic boycotts and leverages similar to those experienced by Manila when it initiated legal proceedings.

Nevertheless, the strategy does provide an equalizer to China’s aggressive maritime military tactics. Beijing’s quick response to Le Hoai Trung’s statements demonstrates an urgency to avoid international attention, and while Beijing can make threats, current distractions elsewhere provide the impetus for Hanoi to consolidate this advantage and opportunity to engage the international community in its plight.

Naturally, none of these opportunities will resolve Vietnam’s woes. Hanoi is acutely aware of this. However, what they do provide is potential diplomatic leverage, which Hanoi may then exploit to better defend its interests.

Hanoi appears to be positioning itself both implicitly and explicitly against Beijing’s policies. In its 2019 Defence White Paper there was a newly prominent emphasis on international integration and innocent passage, explicitly rejecting Beijing’s own interpretation of the issues as bilateral matters and implicitly dismissing its attempts to insulate Washington. If this is anything to go by, one could expect Hanoi to be similarly direct in both action and statements in 2020.

Ultimately, getting to such a position first requires that Hanoi skilfully use the opportune timing of its political opportunities to focus attention on the region and, more specifically, its own interests. Given how coverage of Vietnamese foreign policy often ebbs and flows, the value of having a prominent international voice while confronting the monolith of Asia is invaluable.

Fortunately for Hanoi, it has some appropriate tools at its disposal.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author.

From: The Interpreter

Opinion: Buying time for Israel

By: Dr Mohammad Makram Balawi

As was widely expected, US President Donald Trump’s plan to resolve the Middle East conflict — the so-called “Deal of the Century” — is officially dead. According to Jason Greenblatt, one of the masterminds behind the deal, the long-awaited American plan will not be presented in the near future. He has since left the Trump Middle East team and gone back to what he knows best: business.

Greenblatt’s boss, Jared Kushner, was not as blunt. He chose to kill his deal silently, by replacing Greenblatt with his former aide Avi Berkowitz, labelled by the US media as Kushner’s “coffee boy”. Since then, all the delusions of peace that the Americans saturated the region with have evaporated with the whole charade heading into oblivion.

The end result of the widely-trailed “Deal of the Century” was simply to buy time for Israel to change the status quo in the occupied West Bank, which should, theoretically, accommodate the promised Palestinian State according to the solution which the Americans and the Europeans have worked for decades to impose on the Palestinians.

In complete identification with the most radical Zionist plans, the Trump administration has stopped talking about the two-state-solution in its official discourse; this is no coincidence. It has been clear from the beginning that the US stand on the conflict shifted overtly towards the Israelis, a move in which Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has played a pivotal role. Zionist and Israeli politics which used to have secular left leanings have shifted to the extreme right.

Netanyahu describes this moment in time as something that will not be repeated: Israel is blessed by having the perfect US President in the White House, allowing Israel to seize more land and legitimise its actions, employing the might of the most powerful state on the planet. This president is not only willing to adopt the right-wing Israeli narrative, but has also virtually created his Middle East team in its image to serve this end. After years of America being anti-Palestinian in policy and practice, Washington is reflecting Netanyahu’s views and agenda; it is clear for all to see.

Nobody, US President or otherwise, has done so many favours for Israel as Donald Trump has: the US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal; recognising Israeli sovereignty over the occupied Syrian Golan Heights; moving the US Embassy to Jerusalem, thus acknowledging the occupied city as Israel’s capital; and basically accepting what amounts to the annexation of occupied Palestinian land for illegal Israeli settlements, to name but a few. Moreover, Trump closed the PLO office in Washington and cut all US aid to UNRWA, which provides essential services to millions of Palestinian refugees in Gaza, the West Bank and neighbouring countries.

Generally speaking, Netanyahu has succeeded in taking Israeli politics with him. The veneer that was necessary to present Israel as a democratic country, represented by the so called Israeli left, has practically vanished. The position of all major Israeli political parties are identical when it comes to such issues as the annexation of the West Bank and Jordan Valley; they all approve. Even the Palestinian “Arab Israeli” members of Israel’s parliament, the Knesset, are isolated; no individuals or parties dare to ally with them lest they are accused of being anti-Israel.

Yet despite all of Netanyahu’s “accomplishments”, what is the end result? Is Israel more secure and an integral part of the region? Will the nightmares that have haunted Israelis for decades whereby they face an existential threat at the hands of their Arab neighbours simply vanish? Where will the Palestinians go if and when the Zionist dream of a “Greater Israel” is accomplished? Will they be deported or will they stay; if the latter, what will their status be? Finally, what kind of state will Israel be at the end of the day?

It looks as if it is an Apartheid state in the making, but can it become the epitome of a one state solution? Either way, Israel will lose. The world does not approve of its excesses any more, and Apartheid is a serious crime which will disenfranchise a large proportion of the Israeli population. Zionists meanwhile will never accept a one state solution because it is the antithesis of Zionism. Israel is falling into a trap that it has made for itself.

In fact, events over the past few years suggest that Israel is in the initial stages of a civil war for the identity of the state and its Zionist soul. The inability to form the government after two elections and the country heading to a third without anticipating any way out of the impasse is merely what can be seen on the surface.

The reality is that Trump has helped Israel to escalate its internal differences and brought it closer to its inevitable collapse. This may not necessarily be at the hands of its enemies, but down to its failure to fulfil the aspiration of the founding fathers to create a modern, secular, democratic state. In driving far to the right, a chasm is appearing at the heart of the Zionist movement which will not only lead to civil war in Israel, but also the loss of support across the Jewish diaspora.

In contrast to Netanyahu’s praise for Donald Trump, the day will come when Israelis will wake up to the fact that the worst thing that happened to them is seeing him in the White House, and having Netanyahu as their Prime Minister. The writing is on the wall, but how much time can they still buy for Israel?

The views expressed in this article belong to the author

56nations to give input at KL Summit

The stage is set for the convening of the Kuala Lumpur Summit (KL Summit) 2019, where the ummah’s state of affairs will come under the spotlight, with participants endeavouring to chart the way forward for the Muslim world.

All eyes will be on the proceedings at the Kuala Lumpur Convention Centre here, the venue for the four-day gathering that ends on Saturday.

It will be steered by Prime Minister and summit chairman Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad, who is known for his vocal views on issues concerning the Muslim world.

Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim Hamad Al Thani, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani are expected to join him, according to a statement by summit organisers.

Erdogan and Rouhani are already in town for the summit, while Sheikh Tamim is expected to arrive today.

Indonesia will be represented by its vice-president, Ma’ruf Amin, and Uzbekistan by its state adviser to the president, Rustam Kasimov.

With 450 delegates from 56 countries of the Muslim world present, issues such as Islamophobia, the incarceration of Muslims and mass migration of Muslims due to civil wars are expected to be highlighted.

Participants in the summit, themed “The Role of Development in Achieving National Sovereignty”, comprise thinkers, intellectuals, politicians and community leaders.

Discussions will be framed by seven thrusts, namely national development and sovereignty; integrity and good governance; culture and identity; justice and freedom; peace, security and defence; trade and investment; and technology and Internet governance.

In recognition of the importance of youth in the Muslim world, the summit’s inaugural youth edition, Youth KL Summit 2019, was held to discuss the role of youth in the development of Muslim countries.

Themed “Youth Empowerment in Facing Global Challenges”, the two-day summit, which concluded yesterday, featured dialogues on six clusters.

The dialogues aimed to boost the wellbeing of youth via the education sector, catalysing digital economy, strengthening the future of youth in politics, gig economy and sustainability, adapting to the challenges of the 4th Industrial Revolution, and boosting integrity and transparency in ensuring good governance.

Resolutions of the Youth KL Summit will be presented to leaders of the KL Summit.

Close to 800 local and international media practitioners are expected to cover the KL Summit.

From: Bernama