Insights from Martin B. Gold.

Mercy A. Kuo

The Diplomat author Mercy Kuo regularly engages subject-matter experts, policy practitioners, and strategic thinkers across the globe for their diverse insights into U.S. Asia policy.  This conversation with Martin B. Gold – recognized authority on U.S. Congressional rules and author of nine books, including “Crosscurrents: US Relations with Nationalist China, 1943-1960” (Lexington 2023) – is the 363rd in “The Trans-Pacific View Insight Series.”

How was the leadership of President Dwight D. Eisenhower instrumental and decisive in setting the foundation for current U.S. policy toward Taiwan?  

The civil war between Chinese Communists and Nationalists was, for the most part, suspended during the Korean conflict, which lasted from 1950 to 1953. After the armistice in Korea, PRC Chairman Mao Zedong renewed efforts to complete what he considered the unfinished business of the civil war and ousting the Chiang Kai-shek government on Taiwan. President Eisenhower sought to keep Taiwan out of Communist hands while simultaneously avoiding being drawn into a war with China and the Soviet Union. 

Eisenhower shielded Taiwan and Nationalist islands adjacent to the coast of China through two instruments. One was the Formosa Resolution, the first Authorization for the Use of Military Force that Congress passed in the 20th century. The second was a Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and Nationalist China. 

However, even as Eisenhower extended the shield of American protection, he guarded against the possibility that Chiang could instigate a war. Thus, he insisted that the side letters accompany the treaty, guaranteeing that offensive actions could not be undertaken without mutual agreement. Accordingly, the treaty was a defensive document and never a blank check that would allow Chinese Nationalists to launch attacks against the mainland. 

The U.S. withdrew from the treaty in 1979. Presently, the United States maintains a policy of strategic ambiguity that suggests there are conditions under which America would help defend Taiwan, but also does not offer a blank check.

Analyze the factors that shifted Washington perceptions of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and the erosion of Nationalist China’s strength. 

During World War II, President Franklin Roosevelt received a stream of assessments from U.S. government observers in China that cast Chiang’s wartime posture in a negative light. Some of these reports were from American diplomats. The most influential came from General Joseph Stilwell, whom Roosevelt had dispatched to China to serve as Chiang’s military adviser. Stilwell repeatedly belittled Chiang’s war commitment and strategies. ADVERTISEMENT

The discord between the Generalissimo and Stilwell grew to the point that the Chiang demanded his recall. In October 1944, Roosevelt reluctantly acquiesced. However, the president felt aggrieved, writing to Chiang, “I regret the inevitable harm it will do to the sympathetic attitude of the American people toward China.” Following Stilwell’s departure, a series of critical press accounts badly tarnished Chiang’s reputation and the value of China’s contribution to the war effort against Japan. 

After the war, President Harry Truman sent General George C. Marshall to China in an unsuccessful attempt to broker a coalition between the Nationalists and Communists. Marshall’s assessment of Chiang’s leadership and the ruling Kuomintang Party reinforced skepticism at senior levels of the Truman administration, which concluded that America could not invest further in propping up Chiang’s government. 

Thus, in January 1950, Truman announced, “The United States Government will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China.” Truman reversed himself after the Korean War began six months later, interposing the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait to forestall a Communist amphibious attack to topple Chiang.

Explain President Eisenhower’s rationale behind the Formosa Resolution submitted to Congress in 1955.

President Eisenhower believed that a strong message needed to be sent to America’s adversaries and allies that both parties and the whole of government stood behind U.S. policy in the Formosa (Taiwan) Strait. He was also aware that President Truman was criticized in Congress for not seeking its express authorization for U.S. engagement in the Korean conflict. Eisenhower believed Truman had erred in not doing so and sought to avoid repeating the mistake. 

Leading congressional Democrats, such as House Speaker Sam Rayburn and House Majority Leader John McCormack, advised Eisenhower that he already had sufficient powers as commander-in-chief to respond to military challenges in the Strait and did not need legislation, but Eisenhower insisted that Congress join hands with the president on the framework and implications of U.S. policy.

Examine the intersection of historical and current challenges and opportunities in U.S. political discourse on the Taiwan issue.  

Support in Congress for the Formosa Resolution and for the Mutual Defense Treaty in 1955 was nearly unanimous. Partisan divisions over the Nationalist government, which were prominent before the Korean War, appeared to have been shelved. While there were several members of Congress who argued that the United States should not help Chiang defend the offshore islands, who opposed preemptive military engagement in the Strait, or who mistrusted Chiang’s motives, these were lonely voices. Relations with the PRC were in deep freeze, especially after direct U.S.-Chinese military hostilities in Korea, so no one in Congress at the time cautioned against strengthening Taiwan as a counterweight to Communist China. 

Support on Capitol Hill for Nationalist China had ebbed by the time President Carter recognized the PRC government in 1979. As a condition of normalization, the United States proclaimed adherence to a one China policy, which included Taiwan, rather than two Chinas or one China, one Taiwan. 

However, the evolution of political democracy on Taiwan and deteriorating relations between the U.S. and the PRC has driven support in Congress to levels unseen since the mid-1950s and, from Beijing’s perspective, weakened U.S. commitment to the one China policy. The U.S. remains opposed to Taiwan separatism and any resolution of the Taiwan question by coercive means.ADVERTISEMENT

Are the seeds of U.S. relations with Nationalist China underpinning Washington’s current approach to Taiwan’s security?

The advent of the Korean War converted what was an exhausted and somewhat recriminatory relationship between the United States and Nationalist China into a firm anti-Communist alliance. As a key link in the island chain that stretched from the Aleutians to Australia, Taiwan assumed a central place in U.S. security planning for the Pacific. A 1952 memo from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense stated, “the self-interest of the United States demands that Formosa be strengthened as an anti-Communist base militarily, economically, politically, and psychologically. The denial of Formosa to Communism is of vital importance to the long-term United States position in the Far East.” 

The strategic importance of Taiwan remains constant to the present day. If it were to come under PRC control, such would enhance Beijing’s capacity to project power in the Western Pacific and complicate the security of the United States and U.S. allies.

(Source: The Diplomat)

Krzysztof Iwanek

In a previous commentary for The Diplomat, I argued that Russia and China have grown so close to each other over the past few years that India has no leverage to stop the process. Some of the replies to that text included this interesting point: regardless of the above, Moscow-Beijing cooperation does not hurt New Delhi’s core interests. It is a point worth considering. 

One potential way to interpret this line of argument is that even if New Delhi does not have a way to stop Beijing and Moscow from deepening their partnership, whatever happened so far between them was not directed against India. With Russia being India’s partner and China being India’s rival, this is certainly how Moscow would like to portray things. New Delhi prefers to present this complex issue in the same way – otherwise, how could India explain its partnership with Russia?

The other way to read the point about not hurting national interests – and this is, I assume, what some commentators imply – is that India does have leverage, but we do not see it being used openly. In other words: The fact that Russia has not helped China hurt India in any way could be a result of New Delhi’s silent pressure. The element of backdoor diplomacy is indeed often raised in discussions on the relations in the tangled India-Russia-China triangle. It is believed that while New Delhi does not want to counter Moscow’s ties with Beijing openly (in order to avoid hampering its own partnership with Russia), it continues to send some signals to the Russians about forms of cooperation with the Chinese that India considers a redline. 

However, hard facts speak against this. Silent pressure is, of course, impossible to properly analyze, unless one is an insider. However, if we see the Russians and Chinese issuing statements and performing actions that hurt India’s national interests – and we do – then the point about backdoor diplomacy becomes irrelevant. India’s silent pressure, whatever form it is taking, is clearly not working. And here are the facts that prove this.
First, Russia has been the biggest supplier of arms to China. Obviously, Russia has played exactly the same role for India. But I fail to see how this is not hurting India’s national interests. A better way to express this would be that Russia is hurting both India and China’s national interests by selling to both countries.

Second, China has clearly been treated as a more important client for Russian weapons than India (and overall, China is a much more important client for Russia than India is). Moscow sells some of its more advanced platforms to Beijing but not to New Delhi. This short list includes Su-35 fighter jets; it also used to include the S-400 system. In the latter case, the situation has admittedly changed: A few years after selling S-400s to the China, Russia exported the same product to India as well (and negotiations with New Delhi were being held at the same time as with Beijing).

One is also left to ponder why the BrahMos missile, jointly developed by Russia and India, has not been sold to any country for a number of years, even though it was reportedly of interest to many buyers among developing countries. One interpretation is that Russia was not inclined to sell the missile to any nation that could use it against China. This factor may have been hampering the prospects for export for years. However, it must be admitted that the decision by the Philippines (as announced in 2021) to buy BrahMos missiles will represent not only the first instance of exporting BrahMos but of the missile being purchased by a country that may well use it against China’s forces one day. 

Third, what often goes unnoticed is that Sino-Russian exchange has strengthened India’s other rival: Pakistan. It is widely believed that Russia prefers India over Pakistan (when it comes to both security relations as well as political ties). This has been always true and remains true, and yet certain changes have occurred. Pakistan is no longer a country with which Russia has no security cooperation. Over the past few years, Moscow initiated joint military exercises with Islamabad and, more importantly, sold small batches of military helicopters to Pakistan. These were Mi-35Es and Mi-171Es; the latter, despite its civilian status, were used for military purposes as well (I covered the Russian arms exports to Pakistan in a 2019 commentary for The Diplomat).ADVERTISEMENT

Moscow’s warming up to Islamabad was not a part of growing Sino-Russian cooperation (at least there is no evidence it was). Neither did a speculated involvement of Russian companies in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor materialize. The gossip about Russian involvement in coal plant construction in the Thar desert or in the Gadani power project in Balochistan (both of these being Chinese projects in Pakistan) turned out to be untrue. But there were other aspects that have linked the three countries in a way that hurt Indian national interests. The JF-17 fighter jet, jointly developed by China and Pakistan, uses Russian engines, the Klimov RD 93. It must be noted that this very aircraft was used to attack Indian territory during the 2019 tensions. 

Fourth, Russia and China have also gone against Indian national interests on the narrative level. Russians are not inclined to criticize India in the context of Sino-Indian tensions; they clearly do not want to be seen as siding with either country. But Russian diplomats do indirectly criticize India when it comes to the China-U.S. rivalry. Here Moscow is clearly picking a side: with China against the United States. Hence any initiative that involves Washington’s cooperation with other countries against Beijing is criticized also by Russian diplomats, not only Chinese. While it is not India that is condemned here directly (but rather U.S.-led initiatives as such), India is one such state that cooperates with the United States against China. 

Time and again, Russian diplomats have issued statements against the Quad, a grouping of four countries that includes India (and counters China). They have similarly been opposing the concept of the Indo-Pacific, which they see as an attempt to build a broader group of countries that are trying to counter growing Chinese influence (and I believe they are right about this objective). Again, India is as much a proponent of the Indo-Pacific as Russia is its critic.

That Russian diplomats were also asking India to join the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) could have also been a diplomatic inconvenience for New Delhi, given its declarations that India will not join. I leave aside the fact that I never liked the discussions on “joining or not joining” the BRI. As the BRI is a not an organization, it does not offer formal membership. But what is important here is what Russia has been implying – that India should open itself to deeper economic cooperation with China and even partially endorse Beijing’s political narrative (on the BRI). Yet what we have witnessed over the last few years has been New Delhi trying to do the exact opposite.

There have been many instances of Moscow and Beijing going hand-in-hand in their diplomatic narratives over the last few years, of one country siding with the other on an issue important for one of the two powers, or for both. For instance, in 2017 U.S. President Donald Trump blamed Pakistan for the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan (and at least that time he was right). At this point Beijing spoke in Islamabad’s defense – and so did Moscow. In 2015, Russia’s initial attempt to hold a dialogue series on Afghanistan, inviting only the representatives of Beijing and Islamabad, went against New Delhi’s interests. Here, however, the Russians mended the mistake by later inviting India to the talks too. That China is in fact siding with Russia in its narrative on the invasion of Ukraine, rather than being neutral, as Beijing pretends to be, is another obvious factor. Russians have similarly criticized the AUKUS deal or the plan to place the U.S. THAAD missile system in South Korea (in the latter instance, the Russians and the Chinese even issued a joint statement against this, a fact I witnessed during the Xiangshan Forum in Beijing at the time). 

All such initiatives or actions – the Quad, Indo-Pacific, AUKUS, THAAD in South Korea, and many more – are aimed at balancing the growing Chinese threat. Thus, all of them represent a direct or indirect benefit to India. At the same time, all of them have been diplomatically countered by Russia. 

Certainly, in international relations words matter much less than weapons and money, but they hold their significance too. The diplomatic level only serves as additional evidence of how Sino-Russian cooperation is dangerous to India, and of how in recent years even the Russians have been vocal in stating that they stand with Beijing on a growing number of issues. Yet, even if one is to disregard the diplomatic narrative, the hard facts still stand on their own. That a Pakistani aircraft designed with China, and powered by a Russian engine, hit Indian territory is the most visible aspect of how Moscow-Beijing cooperation threatens New Delhi.

India’s diplomatic response to this has been ambiguous in a way which, in my opinion, has brought New Delhi more awkward moments than actual benefits. In 2017, India joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), an organization jointly led by China and Russia, but Pakistan was admitted to the body at the same time. This led to rather bizarre optics. While membership in the SCO involves (at least declarative) anti-terrorist cooperation and joint military drills, India is mostly threatened by terrorism emanating from one SCO member (Pakistan) and by the armed forces of another SCO member (China).

Similarly, while bilateral military exercises between India and China have been discontinued over the past few years, India is still accepting Russian invites to multilateral armed forces’ drills that happen to also host Chinese soldiers. Last time this happened was in 2022, despite Indian and Chinese soldiers fighting each other in Ladakh in 2020. Yet New Delhi canceled the participation of its diplomat in the opening ceremony 2022 Winter Olympics after it turned out that one of the Chinese soldiers that took part in the torch relay fought against the Indians in 2020. Somehow the participation of that man in a sports event was controversial for New Delhi, but engaging in military drills along the Chinese soldiers in Russia the same year was not. There is no word to describe the Indian government’s stand on this other than “incoherent.” 

India, China, and Russia joining the same organizations, projects, or events is a detail used by Moscow to claim that it is striving to build bridges of friendship between New Delhi and Beijing. This is of benefit to Russian diplomacy which thus acquires more navigating space between India and China. But at the same this is a challenge for Indian diplomacy. New Delhi’s post-2020 position that India is now bolder in its dealings with China is being diluted by its other moves, such as the ones pointed to above. As backdoor pressure is clearly not yielding any benefits, in time India will likely be forced to draw its redlines on Sino-Russian cooperation openly.

(Source: The Diplomat)

Kelly Ng, BBC

China says it will prosecute a Taiwanese man for alleged secession, in the latest move against Taiwan-linked individuals on mainland Chinese soil.

Yang Chih-yuan, the founder of a pro-independence Taiwanese political party, was detained in China last year.

In recent weeks China has also detained a book publisher and reporters working for a Taiwan broadcaster.

Taiwan has criticised China’s “arbitrary arrests”, saying they were “severely damaging” to human rights.

The latest case centres on Mr Yang, who was based in Taiwan and had founded the Taiwanese National Party.

The 32-year-old had travelled to China last year for unknown reasons. In August, he was arrested in the eastern Chinese city of Wenzhou on suspicion of “separatism”.

At the time his detention was linked to a Chinese crackdown on “separatists” amid tensions over former US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan.

On Tuesday, Chinese authorities said they had completed an investigation into Yang Chih-yuan and had put him under formal arrest.

Chinese state media reported that he had been “poisoned by thoughts of Taiwan independence secessionism for a long time” and been “actively scheming” to work towards formal statehood for Taiwan.

Through his party he had “actively planned and implemented” a series of events to “seek independence and reject unification”, fuelling cross-strait tensions.

State media also said that Mr Yang had advocated for Hong Kong’s independence with other “separatist” forces.

The issue of “secession” is sensitive in China as it sees Taiwan as a breakaway province that will eventually be brought under Beijing’s control.

On Tuesday, Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, a cabinet-level agency responsible for cross-strait relations, said it had repeatedly asked for Mr Yang to be released since his arrest in August, but did not receive a positive response from China.

News of Mr Yang’s prosecution comes after the disappearance of Taiwan-based book publisher Li Yanhe earlier this month.

Chinese authorities have not released any details on Mr Li’s case, and his alleged arrest was first reported by his friends.

Mr Li, who is better known by his pen name Fucha, was born in China and relocated to Taiwan in 2009. There, he set up Gusa Press, which has published books that are critical of Beijing.

Friends say Mr Li had arrived in China earlier this month to visit relatives as well as for Qing Ming, the annual Chinese tomb-sweeping festival.

Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council said last week that Li was “safe” and that the government is paying attention to the case, but declined to give further details.

Mr Li’s alleged detention has been widely compared with the disappearance of five Hong Kong booksellers in 2015 from a shop known for selling works critical of China. They eventually turned up in the custody of mainland Chinese authorities, amid an investigation into their publishing business.

Dozens of writers, scholars and activists have called for his release. The Taiwan Foreign Correspondents Club said on Monday that China should “respect the freedom of the press that it enshrines in its constitution, and to release all unjustly imprisoned media workers”.

Also this month, two Taiwan-based reporters for Taiwan’s EBC News were detained by Chinese authorities while filming military exercises in Pingtan county in China’s Fujian province.

Local media have identified the reporters by the last names, Huang and Li. They are said to be safe and maintain daily contact with a director at their company.

Taiwanese authorities on Tuesday reminded their residents to “assess relevant risks” before visiting China.

“You should realise that mainland China is accustomed to random violations of personal safety,” a MAC spokesperson said.

China and Taiwan: The basics

• Why do China and Taiwan have poor relations? China sees the self-ruled island as a part of its territory and insists it should be unified with the mainland, by force if necessary
• How is Taiwan governed? The island has its own constitution, democratically elected leaders, and about 300,000 active troops in its armed forces
• Who recognises Taiwan? Only a few countries recognise Taiwan. Most recognise the Chinese government in Beijing instead. The US has no official ties with Taiwan but does have a law which requires it to provide the island with the means to defend itself

James Palmer

Chinese Diplomat Goes Off Message

This week, China is dealing with the diplomatic fallout from ill-judged comments made by its ambassador to France, Lu Shaye. During a TV interview last Friday, Lu seemed to question the sovereignty of former Soviet states such as Ukraine. “Even these ex-Soviet countries don’t have an effective status in international law because there was no international agreement to materialize their status as sovereign countries,” he said. The remark prompted immediate outrage, especially among the Baltic states.

European politicians already skeptical of China seized on Lu’s comments. Despite French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent red-carpet visit to Beijing, China’s relationship with much of Europe has declined since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic—and even more so since Russia invaded Ukraine last year. A stalled trade deal between China and the European Union now appears dead. Beijing’s reputation has especially suffered in Eastern Europe, thanks in part to its attempt to bully Lithuania over its relations with Taiwan.

Yet Lu’s remarks diverge from China’s official position: Beijing has never questioned the legitimacy of former Soviet states and has enjoyed relatively good relationships with them for much of the last three decades. When asked about Lu’s comments on Monday, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said, “China respects the status of the former Soviet republics as sovereign countries after the Soviet Union’s dissolution.” The Chinese Embassy in Paris removed the online transcript of Lu’s comments and said he spoke in a private capacity.

So, how did Lu make such a slip-up? The ambassador has a record of aggressive nationalist comments. Last year, Lu referred to the need to subject the Taiwanese public to “reeducation” after a hypothetical Chinese conquest; he also accused “foreign forces” of being behind the mass protests that eventually helped end China’s strict zero-COVID policy. In 2019, while he was ambassador to Canada, Lu accused Canada of “white supremacy” for detaining Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou on a U.S. extradition request.

Lu has openly boasted about his so-called wolf warrior status, and so far the aggressive posturing seems to have boosted his career. After all, he landed the cushy post in France. But unlike some instances of wolf warrior diplomacy, Lu’s recent statement doesn’t align with any Chinese goal. He may have intended to say something more moderate, such as that post-Soviet territorial disputes are not fully resolved.

Russia’s war in Ukraine puts China in an awkward position. Beijing supports Moscow both because of their long-standing near-alliance and shared anti-Western sentiment, while its diplomatic language has stressed sovereignty and self-determination. However, China defines sovereignty on its own terms; its conception has never included Taiwan or Tibet. (It also sees the dissolution of the Soviet Union as a cautionary tale.) It’s possible some Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials see the sovereignty of post-Soviet states as not fully determined—an idea that Lu could have repeated.

Ultimately, leaders in Beijing—and particularly Chinese President Xi Jinping—remain responsible for appointing figures such as Lu to key positions. (Last week, China faced backlash after its ambassador to the Philippines implied that Filipino workers in Taiwan might be at risk amid rising tensions.) Although the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs seemed to disavow Lu’s statement, it hasn’t apologized—and it almost never does to foreigners.

Beijing may be institutionally incapable of fully walking back the comments since it could be seen as humiliating and would likely require approval from the very top. That’s a big problem when the government is sending wolf warriors such as Lu out to howl.

(Source: Foreign Policy)