China positions Pakistan as nuclear power export springboard

MIFRAH HAQ

China is accelerating its civil nuclear cooperation with Pakistan, as it seeks export customers in a market dominated by Russia and the West.

A nuclear energy deal Pakistan signed with China in June, reportedly worth $4.8 billion, might appear a curious move on Beijing’s part. China has already had a bumpy ride in Pakistan’s power business, where coal-operated stations have suffered from a debilitating cash crunch amid the South Asian country’s foreign exchange shortage.

Yet experts say the new arrangement is more about China’s strategic ambitions than economics.

“China wants to continue to build nuclear power plants in Pakistan to build up a track record for Chinese industry to enter other, perhaps more lucrative and less-captive nuclear power markets,” said Mark Hibbs, nonresident senior fellow for the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Under the deal, China will build a 1,200-megawatt plant at the Chashma nuclear power complex in central Pakistan. It will feature what Beijing says is its first indigenous civil nuclear reactor, the Hualong One, a third-generation pressurized water reactor jointly developed by the China National Nuclear Corporation and the China General Nuclear Power Group.

The new unit will be the fifth at the complex, which was built with Chinese assistance and currently feeds 1,230 MW to the national grid.

China previously supplied this type of reactor to a nuclear power station in the southern port city of Karachi. Construction of two units — which came online in the last couple of years, adding a combined 2,200 MW — roughly coincided with the setup of the first Hualong Ones in China, at Fuqing.

Including domestic projects, China has become one of the most prolific builders of nuclear plants. But beyond Pakistan, its export plans are largely aspirational, with officials having suggested that by 2030 China could build 30 overseas reactors in countries participating in its Belt and Road Initiative. Last year, China signed a deal to build a nuclear facility in another economically troubled country, Argentina.

“This project is part of our energy security plan to diversify the energy mix with a focus on ensuring the provision of cheap electricity to the industry & relief to the common man,” Pakistani Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif tweeted on June 20 following the nuclear deal, saying the project “will be built with Chinese investment of $3.48 billion.”

The prime minister also said China provided a “discount” of $100 million despite facing delays during the tenure of the previous Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf government, led by ousted Prime Minister Imran Khan.

Zongyuan Zoe Liu, a fellow for international political economy at the Council on Foreign Relations, said China does not have much experience exporting nuclear power plants and that President Xi Jinping prioritized foreign reactor sales only after his 2021 pledge at the United Nations General Assembly to stop building overseas coal-fired power projects.

“In this context, it does not make practical sense for Chinese nuclear reactor exporters to charge a high markup,” she said. “What is more important for China is to demonstrate to the world that it has indigenous technology for nuclear reactors that are safe, reliable and affordable. This is, in the long run, in China’s interest to compete with other nuclear power exporters in the global markets.”

Carnegie’s Hibbs said the Hualong One “will likely become the standard light-water reactor for China’s continued nuclear power development, but also a flagship for China’s influence in the global marketplace and in multilateral governance over nuclear power.”

Chinese cooperation has been and will be instrumental in helping Pakistan overcome chronic energy woes. Beijing has helped build energy facilities, mostly coal-fired power plants and hydropower projects, under its $50 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the Pakistani component of the Belt and Road Initiative.

But costly fuel imports, including coal for BRI power plants, coupled with rupee devaluation, have weighed heavily on Pakistan’s dollar reserves and contributed to a balance of payments crisis that forced it to strike an 11th-hour bailout deal with the International Monetary Fund on Friday.

Pakistan defaulted on dues to Chinese-operated coal plants totaling $1.5 billion. The plants have been unable to import coal, and thus many have stopped operating. New coal power projects have also been shelved, apart from a recently re-approved one in the port city of Gwadar, the centerpiece of CPEC.

Nevertheless, Hibbs explained that “China has a supply chain and workforce in place in Pakistan for Hualong One, and without new foreign contracts elsewhere, China wants to keep these assets active.”

Aside from the economic question marks, however, China’s cooperation with Pakistan also raises eyebrows among the Nuclear Suppliers Group, a voluntary organization of 48 countries that conduct civilian nuclear trade under strict guidelines. Pakistan is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and conforms to only facility-specific safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency — as opposed to the full-scope safeguards that allow the IAEA to inspect both civil and military nuclear facilities required for nuclear trade.

China says that its ongoing exports to Pakistan are “grandfathered” by agreements dating back years before China’s entry into the NSG in 2004, although NSG members assert that exports after entry should conform to the full-scope rule.

(Source: Nikkei Asia)

China tightens Xi Jinping’s powers against the West with new law

Kelly Ng

China is adding to Xi Jinping’s vast powers with a new law that will assert Beijing’s interests on the world stage.

The law threatens to punish entities that act in ways “detrimental” to China’s interests but does not specify which lines should not be crossed.

Experts say the law underscores China’s aggressive diplomacy, but how actively it will be enforced when it takes effect on 1 July remains to be seen.

After all, China has been keen to court foreign investment post Covid.

Jacques deLisle, a law and political science professor from the University of Pennsylvania, said much of the law is “relatively empty rhetoric and largely familiar” but it spells a more assertive foreign policy and stronger pushback against the US.

State media outlet The Global Times called the law a “key step to enrich the legal toolbox against Western hegemony”.

Dr Chong Ja-Ian, a non-resident scholar at Carnegie China, said it was a “signal” of Beijing’s intention to “actively pursue their interests in ways that include more coercion and pressure, even as they hold out the attraction of cooperation and economic gains”.

China’s leaders tread an “inherent tension” between their pursuit of economic development and protection of national security and interests, said Manoj Kewalramani, who leads the China Studies Programme at Indian think tank the Takshashila Institution.

“This push and pull is likely to continue,” he said.

Relations between Beijing and Washington in particular have been strained in recent years, with the two superpowers exchanging a series of tit-for-tat trade sanctions.

Chinese authorities have taken a series of actions against Western firms, including raiding and shuttering the local offices of several US-headquartered consulting firms this year.

These are widely perceived as retaliatory moves to growing trade and technology restrictions from the US.

Last month, it banned products made by US memory chip giant Micron.

Dr Chong said the new foreign relations law could result in more international compliance with China’s interests, but could also lead to pushback from other governments.

“Foreign businesses may wish to reconsider their exposure to the Chinese market or public positions they take, including political ones, if they haven’t already.

“The legislation provides more legal basis for the raids and investigations of foreign firms that have already been happening,” he said.

Still, the law does not guarantee that China will take these stronger actions.

Top business executives from the US, including Elon Musk and JPMorgan’s Jamie Dimon have visited China in recent weeks emphasising China’s importance to the US economy.

Experts say that how the law defines China’s foreign relations in the context of ideology is particularly striking.

“The People’s Republic of China conducts foreign relations to uphold its system of socialism with Chinese characteristics, safeguard its sovereignty, unification and territorial integrity, and promote its economic and social development,” the law states.

It adds that China conducts foreign relations “under the guidance of” the political ideologies of Xi Jinping, Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and Marxism-Leninism, among others.

The law puts in writing for the first time that it is the ruling Communist Party, instead of the state, that directs foreign policy – it also represents Mr Xi’s tightening grip on power.

“[The law] is strikingly explicit on party leadership over foreign relations, underscoring the Xi era trends of migration of power – from the state to the party, and within the party, to Xi,” said Dr deLisle.

China’s top diplomat Wang Yi called it “an important measure to strengthen the Communist Party Central Committee’s centralised and unified leadership over foreign affairs,” according to an editorial published on Thursday in state-run newspaper People’s Daily.

Mr Kewalramani said the new law could, however, stifle discussion and disagreements on foreign policy issues.

But, he added, its overall implications can only be understood in time, depending on the courts’ interpretation of the legislation and the punitive costs that are imposed.

(Source: BBC)

مقال بفورين بوليسي: اقتراب الصين من روسيا أيديولوجيا انتهى

نشرت مجلة فورين بوليسي (Foreign Policy) الأميركية مقالا يفيد بأن الاقتراب الصيني من روسيا أيديولوجيا قد انتهى، وأن ما كانت تأمله الصين من دفاع البلدين عن عقيدة سياسية واحدة وعن فضائل (للاستبداد) ضد (الهجوم) المتخيل من الليبرالية الغربية الديمقراطية؛ قد فتر.

وأضاف كاتب العمود بالمجلة هوارد فرينش في مقاله أنه لم تعد لدى الصين أي طريقة ممكنة لفهم أو تفسير “البوتينية” (إشارة إلى الرئيس الروسي فلاديمير بوتين) بشكل يجعل بكين مرتاحة للاقتران الأيديولوجي بينهما، وبدلا من كونهما حليفين؛ برزت روسيا حاليا وبشكل متزايد بوصفها مشكلة بالنسبة للصين.

شعور الصين بأنها في مأزق

وأوضح فرينش (وهو أستاذ في كلية الدراسات العليا للصحافة بجامعة كولومبيا) أن المعروف علنا هو أن الرئيس الصيني شي جين بينغ أدلى ببيان قوي بشكل غير عادي عن تعاطفه مع روسيا وبوتين أوائل العام الماضي، عندما تحدث عن صداقتهما على أنها “لا حدود لها”.

وتابع أنه ومنذ ذلك الحين، ظلت الصين في مأزق لتوضيح أن هذا لا يعني أن البلدين قد دخلتا في تحالف، ووقعت بكين في عملية موازنة دقيقة وحتى مكلفة، في محاولة لإظهار الدعم لموسكو وفي  الوقت نفسه عدم الوقوع في ما يمكن أن يكلفها في علاقتها مع واشنطن، مثل تجنب ظهور الأسلحة الصينية الفتاكة لدى جيش بوتين الضعيف. ولتجنب إلحاق ضرر جسيم بالعلاقات مع أوروبا، كان على الصين أن تحافظ على موقفها بأنها ليست مهتمة كثيرا بانتصار روسي بقدر اهتمامها بنوع من النتائج العادلة والسلمية. لكن الدول الأوروبية التي تشعر بالتهديد من “تهور” بوتين والغضب من تكلفة الصراع تبدو أقل ميلا للإيمان بمساعي الصين الحميدة.

الازدراء الهادئ

وأضاف الكاتب أنه من المرجح أن الرئيس شي ينظر إلى المشهد المتدهور لروسيا بشيء من الازدراء الهادئ، وأن تاريخ الصين منذ منتصف القرن العشرين وحتى الآن يشهد على أنها تعتقد أنه لا يوجد نظام في روسيا (الاتحاد السوفياتي سابقا) يستحق القتال من أجله، وأن التمرد الأخير الذي نفذه قائد مجموعة “فاغنر” يفغيني بريغوجين رسّخ فكرة انحلال النظام الروسي لدى بكين.

وأشار فرينش إلى أن أحد المبادئ التأسيسية لمؤسس جمهورية الصين الشعبية ماو تسي تونغ هو أن يظل جيش البلاد في جميع الأوقات تحت سيطرة واضحة لا لبس فيها وفي خدمة الحزب الشيوعي، مضيفا أن كل زعيم منذ ماو تمسك بهذا الخط.

واستمر الكاتب ليقول إن تاريخ الصين يحمل في طياته أسبابا أقدم للشعور بالنفور من انحلال روسيا في عهد بوتين.

بوتين ومتابعة التاريخ بشكل معاكس

وقال فرينش إنه ولعقود من الزمن قبل انتصار الحزب الشيوعي الصيني عام 1949، كانت الصين ممزقة باستمرار من قبل أمراء الحرب، ومشهد روسيا اليوم يذكر الصينيين بتاريخهم البائس، وإن بوتين يتصرف كما لو كان يتابع التاريخ في الاتجاه المعاكس، فقد اعتمد بشكل متزايد على أمراء الحرب والمليشيات لتعزيز سلطته والسعي إلى تحقيق أهداف إستراتيجية.

ومنذ حرب الشيشان في مطلع القرن، ظل بوتين يعتمد على المليشيات، مثل اعتماده على القوات الموالية لأحمد قديروف لإخماد تمرد انفصالي هناك. وفي العام الماضي في حرب أوكرانيا، ذهب بوتين إلى أبعد من مضاعفة تلك الإستراتيجية، إذ اعتمد بشدة على مجموعة فاغنر.

صمت الصين المؤقت تجاه تمرد فاغنر

وقال فرينش إن مبدأ الصين وعداءها للمليشيات أو أي كيان عسكري خارج قبضة الدولة يساعد في تفسير سبب صمت بكين فترة طويلة بعد تمرد بريغوجين قصير الأجل، وعندما بدأت بكين أخيرا التعليق كان الأمر مجرد التعبير عن الرغبة اللطيفة في أن تتمكن جارتها بطريقة ما من الحفاظ على استقرارها الوطني.

ومع ذلك، يقول الكاتب إنه لا ينبغي لأي من هذا أن يوحي بأن الصين ستغسل يديها من روسيا أو بوتين؛ فهما جاران مسلحان نوويا ومرتبطان بالعديد من الأشياء؛ من اعتماد روسيا المتزايد على الصين بوصفها مشتريا للهيدروكربونات، إلى تدفق المهاجرين الاقتصاديين الصينيين إلى الأراضي الحدودية ذات الكثافة السكانية المنخفضة في الشرق الأقصى الروسي.

المصدر : فورين بوليسي

Modi Visits US Amidst Human Rights Criticism

Arif Jamal

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi recently embarked on a state visit to the United States, where he addressed a joint session of Congress. However, Modi’s visit was met with huge criticism from both India and the US. Many questioned America’s stance on Modi’s illiberal and anti-democratic policies. They raised concerns about Modi’s past human rights record in Gujarat when he was the Chief Minister of the state, as well as the growing discrimination against Muslims since he assumed office as Prime Minister. As a result, there were calls for US President Joe Biden to discuss these issues with Modi during the visit.

However, the White House declined to raise the concerns regarding human rights violations and discrimination against Muslims during their meeting with Modi. They stated that President Biden would not lecture Modi on India’s democratic record during the visit. In a joint press conference at the White House, Modi faced a single scripted question, raising eyebrows as he appeared to answer from a teleprompter. Although the question was related to minority rights, Modi chose to emphasize India’s democratic achievements rather than directly addressing the concerns about minority rights in the country.

Modi’s US Visit: Obama’s Views on Minority Rights in India

Former US President Barack Obama weighed in on Modi’s visit. Expressing his belief, he said that that discussing the rights of ethnic minorities, particularly Muslim minorities, with Modi was essential. Obama emphasized that if India fails to protect the rights of ethnic minorities, it risks “pulling apart.” However, his comments drew criticism from leaders of India’s ruling government. BJP leader and Chief Minister of Assam, Himanta Biswa Sharma, who was sarcastically questioned if action would be taken against Obama by the Assam police for criticizing the Prime Minister replied that he would go after “Hussain Obamas” within the country first. It is worth noting that the Assam police is known for taking action against critics of Modi.

Also Read: Why Is Indian PM Modi’s Silent About Attacks Against Muslims?

Backlash from Indian Leaders towards Obama

India’s Finance Minister, Nirmala Sitharaman, also strongly rebuked Obama for his statement. She suggesting that Obama was the real enemy of Muslims, while Modi was a friend to the Muslim community. Sitharaman supported her claim with data, pointing out that during Obama’s tenure, he had conducted military operations in six Muslim-majority countries. At the same time, out of the total 13 state honours that Modi has received, six were from Muslim-majority countries.

Notably, Egypt recently conferred its highest state honour on Modi, further highlighting his international recognition by Muslim dictators. In 2018, the Palestinian Authority also awarded him the Grand Collar of the State of Palestine, the highest Palestinian honor for foreign dignitaries.

Also Read: BBC’s Modi Documentary Rattles Modi Government

Modi’s Ban from Entering the US

It is significant to mention that prior to becoming Prime Minister in 2014, Modi had faced a decade-long ban from entering the US due to “severe violations of religious freedom”. He was the only person in the world denied a US visa for this reason. However, after assuming office, the US revoked the ban, allowing him to travel to the country on several occasions.

Strategic Interests: US-India Partnership

The question that arises is why the US chose to host Modi despite his democratic transgressions. In recent years, there has been a growing strategic interest between the US and India, driven by the rise of China. While India had previously adopted a non-aligned foreign policy, it is now leaning towards closer ties with the US. The US sees India’s geographic location as an advantage in countering China’s influence and seeks to involve India in its strategy to contain China, especially considering India’s existing disputes with its neighboring country. As a member of the QUAD, a group aiming to counter China, India’s support is crucial for the US.

US’ Compromised Stance on Human Rights

It is worth noting that while the US often speaks out against authoritarian regimes with which it lacks mutual interests, it paradoxically encourages and supports worse authoritarians and dictators around the world if they align with its interests. The US operates based on the principle of pursuing its permanent interests rather than maintaining permanent friendships.

Also Read: Why BJP is Fascist Despite Contesting Elections.?

Balancing Interests and Ethics

In conclusion, Modi’s recent visits to the US was marred by criticism regarding his human rights record and concerns about the treatment of minority communities in India. Despite these criticisms, the US government chose to host Modi, prioritizing strategic interests and the containment of China over addressing human rights issues. The strategic partnership between the US and India has gained importance due to the geopolitical dynamics in the region. India’s potential as a counterbalance to China has led the US to turn a blind eye to Modi’s policies against the Muslim minority. India’s participation in the QUAD, a coalition aimed at countering China’s influence, further solidifies its significance in the US strategy.

While the US is known for condemning authoritarian regimes, it often compromises its principles when there are mutual interests at stake. This inconsistency raises questions about the ethical foundations of US foreign policy and its willingness to support leaders with questionable democratic records.

(Source: MZEMO)

The rise of China as a chess power

China’s ascent as a global chess powerhouse has been nothing short of extraordinary. From its humble beginnings, China has now emerged as a dominant force in the chess world. The unfolding of China’s path to chess dominance is something which should be looked at carefully and studied

According to the June 2023 FIDE rating list, in the top 20 chess players in the world in the open section, China has two. However, in the women’s section, China has five players (with three of them occupying the top five positions). China currently ranks third in the countries’ average ratings for the top ten players, even though it has notably fewer Grandmasters than India, Ukraine or Germany, all of which are behind China. How did this happen?

In a culture where tradition, resourcefulness and taking a long view of life make up essential elements of identity – chess would seem like a natural choice for a national sport. Still, their own board games – Chinese chess and go – are most prominent in China. In fact, not until the start of the second part of the 20th century did chess begin to gain a foot in the country of the Red Dragon.

From Xiangqi to FIDE and Dato

Chess was initially not well received in China. Because of this, the game was first recognised as a small part of the huge Chinese Xiangqi Association in November 1962. With small chess projects in schools and national tournaments, as well as four friendly matches with the Soviets (who did not send their top players), chess was making small steps. However, the game was pushed to the margins during the Cultural Revolution when it was included in the list of activities considered “decadent”. Still, it survived.

Fortune smiled on chess in China in the 1970s – with restrictions easing. A 1974 meeting in Kuala Lumpur, where raising the profile of chess in Asia was discussed, made China the focal point of the push. This effort involved not only providing more outside support for the game but also getting the Chinese authorities on board and getting more state support.

By 1975 the Chess Association of China officially joined FIDE, and Chinese players started participating in international events the following year.

A crucial role in the development of chess in the Country of the Red Dragon was played by Dato’ Tan Chin Nam, a chess philanthropist from Malaysia, who lit the torch that spread the chess flame across China and set it on a path to become a major world power on the 64-squared checkerboard.

From small steps to giant leaps

Having won second place in the 1977 Asian Championship, China announced its entrance to the chess world with confidence at the 1978 Chess Olympiad in Buenos Aires – the first chess Olympiad the country took part in. With an average ELO of 2273, the Chinese team first stunned Iceland (which had the later FIDE President Frederic Olafsson on board one) in the first round and also managed to hold to a draw the team of Netherlands, then featuring the now legendary players – Jan Timman, Gena Sosonko and Johannes Donner (who lost to a Chinese player in 20 moves!).

Then, gradually, successes came about: second place at the Asian Team Chess Championship in 1979, 1981, first gold in 1983, then again in 1987, 1989, and 1991. From 8th place at the 1984 Olympiad, China progressed to sixth place in 1990. In addition, Chinese players started winning numerous events across Asia and were making their presence felt globally. As chess progressed in China, the state warmed up and provided more support.

In the 2010s, China started making podiums in the chess team events – the women’s team won silver medals at the Olympiad in 2010, 2012, and 2014 while the men’s team won gold at the 2014 Olympiad and repeated that success in 2018 and the 2021 Olympiad (the last one being held online due to the COVID-19 pandemic at the time).

During all this time, state support for chess was increasing on the national and regional/local levels.

Somewhat surprisingly, the Chinese started making giant leaps in women’s chess.

In the 1980 Chess Olympiad, when the Chinese women’s team made their first appearance, they captivated the chess world by drawing with Olympic title holders from the USSR and finishing in sixth place ahead of the traditionally strong women’s teams from Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. The ascent of the women’s team in the chess realm continued, culminating in a remarkable tie for 3rd place at the 27th Chess Olympiad held in Dubai, UAE.

The Chinese women players officially asserted their chess dominance after the breakup of the USSR in 1991, when Xie Jun (pictured above) won the title she held until 1996, and again between 1999 to 2001. In 2010 another Chinese, Hou Yifan, won the crown, becoming the youngest Women’s World Champion. She defended the title three times (in 2011, 2013, 2016) and even today is ranked as the world’s number one woman player, despite retiring from active chess in 2019.

Her crown was taken over by another Chinese – Tan Zhongyi (2017-2018) and another, Ju Wenjun (as of 2018).

The parallel between Soviet and Chinese dominance in women’s chess is striking. Both share a foundation built on robust government support and a well-established system where seasoned players mentor emerging talents.

The resources and the hope

With players in the 2700+ club, featuring world champion Ding Liren, Yu Yangyi, Wang Hao (the winner of the inaugural Grand Swiss in 2019, the world’s strongest classical chess tournament ever) and Wei Yi, and several super strong GMs all in their 20s and 30s, China is a dominant chess power today.

The highest point (so far) in this Chinese chess march is the 2023 Ding Liren’s victory in the title match to determine the new World Champion in chess. Currently, China holds both the crowns in open and women’s chess – a unique success only achieved before by the Soviet Union.

As chess is becoming dominated by even younger players, the resources of young talent China has at its disposal are almost impossible to match by anyone, bar maybe India. Given the vast number of students that China can rely on, it comes as no surprise that these schools produce a multitude of exceptional players.

Ding Liren’s recent success has not only made him a hero in his own country but also given impetus to chess in a nation where tens of millions already play the game.

The forthcoming women’s match in China, played by two Chinese players, will be the first point where the country of the Red Dragon will show its new flare to the world. The hope is that there will be more chess events taking place in the Far East and that there will be more investment in the game.

(Source: International Chess Federation)

الصين في طريقها لتصبح أكبر مشترٍ للغاز الطبيعي المسال.. ماذا حدث؟

تشهد الصين فورة تسوق للغاز الطبيعي، ويركز المسؤولون على استمرار المستوردين في إبرام الصفقات حتى بعد انحسار أزمة الطاقة العالمية.

بدورها، تواصل الحكومة دعم جهود المشترين المملوكين للدولة لتوقيع عقود طويلة الأجل وحتى الاستثمار في مرافق التصدير، من أجل تعزيز أمن الطاقة خلال منتصف القرن، وفقاً لما نقلته “بلومبرغ” عن أشخاص عقدوا اجتماعات مع صانعي السياسات، واطلعت عليه “العربية.نت”.

وباتت الصين في طريقها لتصبح أكبر مستورد للغاز الطبيعي المسال في العالم في عام 2023.

وللعام الثالث على التوالي، وافقت الشركات الصينية على شراء المزيد من الغاز على أساس طويل الأجل أكثر من أي دولة بمفردها، وفقاً للبيانات التي جمعتها “بلومبرغ”.

تفادي أزمة الطاقة

وتتطلع الصين إلى المستقبل لتجنب تكرار نقص الطاقة، بينما تسعى أيضاً إلى دعم النمو الاقتصادي. تعد عقود الغاز الطبيعي المسال طويلة الأجل جذابة لأن الشحنات موعودة بسعر ثابت نسبياً مقارنة بالسوق الفوري، حيث ارتفع الغاز إلى مستوى غير مسبوق بعد الغزو الروسي لأوكرانيا.

من جانبه، قال الرئيس العالمي للتجارة والاستشارات في شركة “ترايدنت للغاز الطبيعي المسال” في شنغهاي، توبي كوبسون: “لطالما كان أمن الطاقة أولوية بالنسبة للصين. إن وجود معروض وافر في محفظتهم يسمح لهم بإدارة التقلبات المستقبلية، وأتوقع رؤية المزيد”.

ستساعد جهود إبرام الصفقات في دعم مشاريع التصدير العالمية، وتعزيز الدور الذي سيلعبه الوقود المنقول بحراً في مزيج الطاقة. ومع تحرك الموردين لجذب المستوردين الصينيين، من المقرر أن يزداد نفوذ بكين في السوق.

طلب الصين

طلب الصين

بدأت الصين خطتها للحصول على عقود طويلة الأجل في عام 2021، بعد تحسن العلاقات مع الولايات المتحدة. بينما تراجعت الواردات العام الماضي جزئياً بسبب ضعف الطلب وسط قيود كوفيد، وجدد المشترون الصينيون توجههم بعد غزو أوكرانيا قطع خط الأنابيب إلى أوروبا”.

بينما قدمت الأسعار المرتفعة الناتجة والمنافسة العالمية للوقود شديد البرودة درساً سريعاً في الحاجة إلى إمدادات مستقرة. ويتمثل جزء من دفع الصين نحو أمن الطاقة في تنويع الواردات بين مختلف البلدان كوسيلة حماية ضد المزيد من الاضطرابات الجيوسياسية.

ويتطلع العديد من المستوردين الآخرين، بما في ذلك الهند، إلى توقيع المزيد من الصفقات لتجنب النقص في المستقبل والحد من الاعتماد على عمليات التسليم الفوري، ومع ذلك فإن الصين تقوم بإغلاق العقود بوتيرة أسرع بكثير. حتى الآن من هذا العام، ذهبت 33% من أحجام الغاز الطبيعي المسال طويلة الأجل الموقعة إلى الصين، وفقاً لحسابات “بلومبرغ”.

وفي الشهر الماضي، أبرمت شركة البترول الوطنية الصينية المملوكة للدولة صفقة مدتها 27 عاماً مع قطر واستحوذت على حصة في مشروع التوسع الضخم للمصدر، بينما وقعت “ENN Energy Holdings” عقداً يمتد لعقود مع شركة التطوير الأميركية “Cheniere Energy”. ومن المقرر أن تبدأ التوريدات من كلا العقدين في أقرب وقت ممكن في عام 2026.

وهناك المزيد من الصفقات في المستقبل القريب حيث تمتد المفاوضات من مجالس الإدارة من سنغافورة إلى هيوستن. تجري الشركات العملاقة المملوكة للدولة، بما في ذلك “Cnooc”، و”Sinopec”، مناقشات مع الولايات المتحدة.

اتفاق مع قطر

وقال متعاملون إن قطر تجري محادثات مع العديد من المشترين الصينيين بشأن عقود بيع قد تستمر لأكثر من 20 عاما.

وستساعد الصفقات في تغذية ما يقرب من 12 محطة استيراد جديدة من المقرر أن تبدأ البناء في جميع أنحاء المدن الساحلية في الصين في هذا العقد. وقد ترتفع واردات البلاد من الغاز الطبيعي المسال إلى 138 مليون طن بحلول عام 2033، أي حوالي ضعف المستويات الحالية، وفقاً لشركة الاستشارات النرويجية “Rystad Energy”.

تخطي الصين واليابان

تخطي الصين واليابان

من جانبه، قال المحلل في “Rystad”، شي نان: “في الوقت الحالي، لا يزال أكثر من نصف طلب الصين من الغاز الطبيعي المسال للفترة من 2030 إلى 2050 بدون عقد”.

ومع ذلك، فإن توقعات الطلب الصعودية ليست مؤكدة، خاصة وأن الصين تعزز إنتاج الغاز في الداخل، في حين أن الشحنات البرية من روسيا قد ترتفع إذا تم إنشاء خطوط أنابيب جديدة. فيما حذر كبير المحللين في شركة “Cnoon”، تشي زوغوانغ، من أن فائض العرض يزيد من خطر احتمال توقف محطات استيراد الغاز الطبيعي المسال عن العمل بشكل متكرر.

أدى انقطاع التيار الكهربائي ونقصه على مدى السنوات القليلة الماضية إلى تغيير تفكير صانعي السياسة في الصين، الذين يفضلون الآن أمن الطاقة على مستوردي الوقود الذين يواجهون فائضاً محتملاً في العرض، وفقاً للتجار الذين تم إطلاعهم على استراتيجية الحكومة.

تأمين الطاقة

يأتي ذلك، فيما أدى نقص الفحم – الوقود الأساسي لتوليد الطاقة في الصين – إلى تقليص الكهرباء على نطاق واسع للمصانع لفترات وجيزة في عامي 2021 و2022، مما أدى إلى تباطؤ النمو الاقتصادي. وردا على ذلك، تعهدت البلاد بزيادة طاقة التنقيب، وارتفع الإنتاج إلى مستويات قياسية، مما أدى إلى تخزين مخزونات جيدة وتقليل الواردات.

الآن، يريد صانعو السياسة أن يفعلوا الشيء نفسه مع الغاز. حيث تدفع بكين شركات الطاقة العملاقة لرفع إنتاج الغاز في الداخل، وخفض تكاليف الحفر لزيادة الاكتفاء الذاتي، وفقاً لأشخاص مقربين من الحكومة.

بدوره، قال رئيس أبحاث الطاقة الصينية في معهد أكسفورد لدراسات الطاقة، ميشال ميدان، “بالنظر إلى أن خطوط الأنابيب الجديدة قيد المناقشة، ولكن لم يتم الانتهاء منها بعد، لا يزال المشترون الصينيون يتطلعون إلى تأمين الإمدادات من سوق الغاز الطبيعي المسال”.

بالإضافة إلى ذلك، كلما توقعت الصين المزيد من الصفقات، زادت سيطرة الدولة على إمدادات الغاز الطبيعي المسال العالمية. وتلعب الصين بالفعل دوراً رئيسياً في تحقيق التوازن في السوق، وإعادة بيع شحنتها المتعاقد عليها للمشترين الأكثر احتياجاً عندما يكون الطلب الداخلي ضعيفاً، حيث من المقرر أن يتوسع هذا الاتجاه مع بدء الصفقات الجديدة هذا العقد.

(المصدر: العربية نت)