Dr Ramzy Baroud

It is feasible for China to continue playing an important role in mediating Middle East conflicts. In fact, it already has. In the case of the Israeli occupation of Palestine, however, mediation is hardly the issue.

Even before Beijing successfully managed to achieve reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Iran last April, Chinese diplomacy has shown exceptional maturity.

For many years, China has been perceived to be an outsider to global affairs, supposedly contending itself to economic expansion or to regional economic integration.

Former US President Donald Trump forced, or rather, accelerated China’s global outreach when, in 2018, he launched an unprecedented trade war with the powerful Asian country.  

Trump’s plan backfired. Not only did Washington fail to dissuade Beijing from bowing to American diktats, but it also inspired what became known as China’s wolf diplomacy – a self-assertive Chinese approach to foreign policy.

From an American – or Western – viewpoint, the new tactic was perceived to be hostile and aggressive. 

But from a Chinese perspective, the new policy was necessitated by the relentless war launched against China by successive US administrations, along with their Western allies

The Russia-Ukraine war, however, accentuated China’s role in international conflicts and diplomacy. Though Beijing’s ‘12-point peace proposal’ last March failed to impress the West and was superficially welcomed by Moscow, the proposal highlighted an important shift.

The fact that China found it necessary to develop an elaborate political position as a potential mediator conveyed that China is no longer content with playing the role of the supporting actor in international forums.

China’s diplomacy was dismissed by many, especially in Western media and politics, as a non-starter, if at all serious or even well-intentioned.

Merely three weeks later, the Chinese-brokered Iran-Saudi agreement took place. 

Major political actors in the region, including Washington, appeared to be taken by surprise. The Chinese success story was juxtaposed by many journalists in the Global South, to Washington’s conflict-prone, dead-end diplomacy in the Middle East. 

Buoyed by its success, China ventured further into new diplomatic territories, offering to mediate between Israel and Palestine. The Palestinians welcomed a Chinese role; the Israelis were disinterested. 

The Chinese government is aware of the near impossibility of engaging both Palestinians and Israelis in genuine peace talks. Though Palestinians are desperate to escape or, at least, balance out Washington’s hegemony, it is not in Israel’s interest to abandon its greatest political benefactor, financier and military backer – the United States.

Though China and Israel have developed relatively strong economic and, for China, strategic ties, in recent years, Beijing’s geopolitical worth for Tel Aviv is simply incomparable to that of Washington.

It would also make little sense for Tel Aviv to grant Beijing any political leverage at a time of geopolitical transitions, especially because China has historically supported the Palestinian people’s struggle for freedom.

Indeed, for decades, China served as a vanguard for the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and, later, the State of Palestine at the United Nations, insisting on the respect and implementation of international laws relevant to ending the Israeli occupation of Palestine. 

Unsurprisingly, China recognised the PLO’s political status in 1965 and the State of Palestine in 1988. Now, China is pushing for full Palestinian membership in the international body. 

The Chinese position was fundamental to Beijing’s strategic alliances in the Global South in previous decades.

The economic growth of China and its integration into a Western-centric economic system, starting in 1978, progressively weakened China’s trade and political relevance in the Global South.

This process, however, is being reversed, not only because of Washington’s trade war, and the hesitance of Western countries to join Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative, but because of the US-led Western sanctions on Moscow. The Western economic war on Russia is an urgent reminder to China that it cannot fully rely on Western markets and financial systems. 

China’s slow drift from a Western-centric economic system is being coupled with a whole new approach to foreign policy – ‘wolf diplomacy’ in the West, and a gentler, kinder approach in the Global South.  

Even before former Foreign Minister of China, Qin Gang phoned his Palestinian and Israeli counterparts, offering mediation, China had already introduced a peace initiative known as the four-point proposal. 

 The proposal highlighted China’s readiness to move past its role as a trade partner into that of a political actor on the global stage.

For China, this was not only a matter of prestige, as various Muslim and Arab countries, along with Israel, are critical parties in the ambitious BRI project. 

In recent months, however, China’s interest in being a peace mediator increased exponentially, especially amid the near total absence of Washington, the self-proclaimed ‘honest peace broker.’ 

China has also shown a willingness to mediate between rival Palestinian groups. That, too, ushers in an evolution in China’s approach to Palestinian politics. However, it will not be easy.

The Palestinian Authority’s (PA) financial well-being – and political future – is largely linked to Washington and other Western capitals. Though Palestinian officials, the like of Foreign Minister Riyad Al-Maliki, are threatening to “turn to China” due to the PA’s “disappointment” in Washington, such a shift will not be permitted, if not by Washington, then by Tel Aviv itself. 

The visit in June by PA President Mahmoud Abbas to Beijing, although touted by the PA-run media as an earth-shattering event, will not be a game changer. True, it highlights China’s growing interests in Palestine, but it is unlikely to be followed by substantive action on the part of the Palestinian leadership.

Palestinians need China, as they need other powerful players in the Global South, but it is not mediation that they desperately require. Mediations do not end military occupations or dismantle apartheid regimes. Instead, Palestinians need solidarity.

The major changes underway in the world’s geopolitical map, and the rising importance of the Global South present Palestinians with unique opportunities to break away from US-Western hegemony and to reconnect with Palestine’s true strategic depth in Asia, Africa, South America and the rest of the world.

For this to occur, Palestinians must present their cause as one united front, not as political fragments and factions. Only then, emerging powers can view Palestine as a serious geopolitical asset in a vastly changing world.

(Source: MEMO)

Alexander Martin

Chinese authorities have pledged to “publicly disclose a highly secretive global reconnaissance system” operated by the U.S. government following an investigation into the alleged hacking of earthquake monitoring equipment in Wuhan.

The claim marks the latest of a series of attempts by the People’s Republic of China to highlight Washington’s intelligence-gathering efforts in response to criticisms of Beijing’s activities, which, according to the U.S., are often conducted in breach of international law by targeting commercial rather than national security material.

The Global Times, China’s state-controlled English-language newspaper, reported Monday that the disclosure would be made as a result of progress in a joint investigation by China’s National Computer Virus Emergency Response Center (CVERC) and the internet security company Qihoo 360 into alleged espionage targeting seismic intensity data.

It quoted Xiao Xinguang, a member of a crucial advisory body to the Chinese Communist Party and the chief software architect at anti-virus company Antiy Labs, saying the seismological data had “significant intelligence value for judging geological terrain, analyzing weapons system tests, and nuclear tests.”

Violation of international law?

Du Zhenhua, a senior engineer from the CVERC, claimed that the “US military intelligence agencies’ use of their information technology advantage to launch cyberattacks on civilian infrastructure is a criminal act in clear violation of international law, seriously infringing on China’s national security and public interest.”

Du warned that if damage had been caused to the monitoring system, it could have impacted early warning and disaster assessment efforts in the case of an earthquake, potentially “leading to more severe loss of life and property.”

“Even more dangerous is that if the attackers tamper with the earthquake monitoring data, triggering false alarms, it could lead to social panic and disorder, resulting in casualties among innocent people,” he added.

It is not clear whether there were any such attempts to cause damage. Recorded Future News previously asked the CVERC whether it had observed any attempts to interfere with the integrity of the seismological data, or if the malware was capable of doing so. Despite an initial interest in receiving our questions, a spokesperson subsequently declined to comment.

The claims by Chinese officials that the data was of legitimate intelligence value and that the computer network exploitation was a violation of international law appear to be inconsistent. Typically, espionage is not considered to be a violation of international law, though there is some ambiguity around the interpretation of the UN Charter on the matter.

The United States explicitly considers espionage a legitimate part of statecraft. It avows the existence of its intelligence agencies and has legislation governing their operations domestically and abroad.

China has been accused of foreign intelligence activities, but Beijing does not publicly avow these. China has also been criticized in the West for what are perceived to be the overly-broad powers afforded to its security apparatus under its laws.

‘It’s espionage. It’s what nation-states do.’

The Global Times’ report on the earthquake monitoring equipment hack was published shortly after Microsoft announced a threat actor based in China known as Storm-0558 had exploited a bug in its cloud email service to spy on government agencies in the U.S. and Western Europe.

Unlike alleged incidents in which state-sponsored Chinese hacking groups have targeted commercial companies to steal intellectual property, or have left exposed web shells on victim servers in what was described as a “reckless” breach of U.N. cyber norms, the Storm-0558 incident did not prompt the U.S. to accuse China of breaking international law.

Rob Joyce, the NSA’s director of cybersecurity, told the Aspen Security Forum that the hack was “China doing espionage” adding: “It is what nation-states do. We have to defend against it, we need to push back against it. But that is something that happens.”

Last September, China denounced the U.S. Embassy in Beijing following a joint report from two of the country’s most prominent cyber authorities accusing the NSA of stealing “sensitive information” from Chinese institutions.

The Northwestern Polytechnical University, which the NSA was accused of targeting, is considered to be “a Chinese military university that is heavily involved in military research,” according to the U.S. Department of Justice — and thus likely to be seen as a legitimate target for espionage under international law.

Global reconnaissance system

Xiao told the Global Times that “by leveraging its global comprehensive reconnaissance ability, along with various means of intrusion, theft, and other comprehensive measures to obtain all kinds of telemetry data, and combining other multi-source auxiliary data, [the U.S.] forms the ability to analyze, judge, attribute, and locate China’s economic, social operations, and even military actions.”

It is not clear that this reconnaissance ability involves, nor did Xiao state when the Chinese authorities would attempt to publicize it. Through the Global Times, officials in the country have made several allegations about U.S. intelligence collection activities in recent years, but these often seem dependent upon material that is already in the public domain.

Reports often cite public-domain material leaked by Edward Snowden, the Shadow Brokers, and WikiLeaks — with a reference to the ECHELON system appearing in Monday’s report.

However they appear without the kinds of details often included in U.S. Department of Justice indictments, nor do they provide indicators of compromise (IoCs) or other technical intelligence used when the Western cybersecurity community attributes similar incidents to China and attempts to inform defenders about how to protect their networks.

(Source: The Record)

Luke Hunt

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi ended a whistle-stop tour of Singapore, Malaysia and Cambodia Sunday as tensions in the hotly disputed South China Sea continued to rise ahead of the Sept. 5-7 ASEAN leaders’ summit in Jakarta.

His four-day trip was designed “to strengthen strategic communication with the three,” according to a Chinese statement ahead of the tour, however, analysts said Wang was also keen to accelerate Beijing’s version of a Code of Conduct for the disputed international sea lanes and had focused on “friendly countries” in ASEAN.

Hunter Marston, a Southeast Asian academic with Australia National University, said shoring-up Chinese goodwill with more pliable partners in the 10-country ASEAN bloc was key, while at the same time isolating Western-leaning countries like the Philippines and Vietnam.

Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has moved his country closer to the U.S. and taken a much harder line against Chinese maritime expansionism since his election last year.

Talks between Manila and Hanoi have also begun for a maritime pact to defend their mutual interests amid confrontations with Chinese vessels in recent weeks, which Marcos says “will bring an element of stability to the problems that we are seeing now in the South China Sea.”

Marston said Wang had to reassert Chinese foreign policy concerning its interests, which meant offering more than simply ignoring a 2016 ruling by an international court in The Hague, which found in favor of the Philippines and rejected Chinese claims in the South China Sea.

“In some way he’s probably making the Philippines feel a little bit out there on its own. In some ways the trips to Malaysia and Singapore are a lot more comfortable places for China to visit in light of Marcos Jr.’s overtures to Washington,” he said.

Beijing’s relations with ASEAN have been tested by its self-proclaimed control of most of the South China Sea through its nine-dash line, an assertion made despite overlapping claims from half of the bloc’s members; Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei.

Perhaps adding to Chinese anxiety is U.S. President Joe Biden, who announced on Tuesday that he would visit Vietnam “shortly” and two days later told a campaign reception in Salt Lake City that the Quad alliance – consisting of the U.S., Japan, India and Australia – was proving effective.

He said the U.S. was now in a position where “the Philippines and, soon, Vietnam and Cambodia” would want to be part of a U.S. relationship. “They don’t want to have a defense alliance, but they want relationships because they want China to know that they’re not alone.”

Gavin Greenwood, an analyst with Hong Kong-based A2 Global said China’s motives rest on a combination of reassurance to an overt ally, Cambodia; greater clarity on future foreign and defense policies with Singapore, and improved relations with Malaysia ahead of the leaders’ summit.

He also said Wang had chosen his countries carefully before embarking on the tour.

Code of Conduct questioned

“Further, Wang’s short Southeast Asia tour omits other key ASEAN members where there are seriously contentious issues – notably the Philippines and Vietnam – and those where there is not – Indonesia, Thailand, Laos and Myanmar.”

Beijing’s commitment to the planned Code of Conduct has also been questioned and blamed for its many delays, with diplomats saying China enjoys a position of strength through bilateral negotiations with individual ASEAN states as opposed to finding a consensus through the agreement with the 10 nations as a bloc.

That was evident last week during a confrontation between Chinese and Philippine vessels at Second Thomas Shoal in the Spratly Islands, where Manila maintains a scuttled naval vessel as an occupied base that Beijing wants removed.

After Wang visited Singapore and Malaysia, the official Chinese state news agency, Xinhua, reported Wang had noted that China had repeatedly expressed its willingness to resolve differences with the Philippines through bilateral dialogue.

It also said Wang hoped that the Philippine side would abide by the consensus reached in the past, and he stressed that China is willing to work with ASEAN countries to accelerate consultations on the Code of Conduct in line with international law.

“The Chinese are clearly trying to put on a nice face by sending Wang around on a diplomatic tour in light of the blatant maritime harassment they have directed against the Philippines and Vietnam in recent weeks,” Marston said.

“It’s also in Beijing’s interests to send Wang, given his recent reappointment as foreign minister, to signal continuity and stability in China’s foreign policy,” he added.

“I think some of it is directly aimed at The Philippines, especially in light of the latest blatant coercion and intimidation tactics.”

Meeting in Cambodia

However, Biden’s references to Cambodia – China’s closest regional ally – were met with disbelief among bureaucrats in Phnom Penh who enjoy a cozy relationship with Beijing and will shortly open a Chinese-funded reconstruction of the Ream Naval Base on the south coast.

“China wants to accelerate the Code of Conduct, which was already happening just before the COVID-19 pandemic erupted and Beijing wants that back on track. In its current form it’s the type of thing that will really annoy the Americans,” said a source close to the Cambodian government.

In Cambodia, Wang lunched with Prime Minister Hun Sen – who has often been accused of acting as China’s proxy within ASEAN – and met with his son, Hun Manet, who will replace his father as prime minister on Aug. 22.

After Wang’s visit, the Chinese embassy in Phnom Penh said China “will, as always, stand with Cambodia, and firmly support Cambodia in following a development path suited to its national conditions, safeguarding national interests and dignity, and playing a bigger role on international and regional occasions.”

Marston said, “The timing of the visit to Cambodia is well placed in light of recent elections, cementing Beijing’s partnership with Phnom Penh but I wouldn’t expect Phnom Penh to depart from Hun Sen’s foreign policy of non-alignment/soft tilt toward China.”

However, the biggest issue confronting Hun Sen since winning last month’s one-sided election remains Cambodia’s struggling economy. Chinese investment and tourists – once a hallmark in ties between the two countries – have not returned since the pandemic subsided.

“Cambodian officials increasingly recognize and openly note that the pre-COVID era of free-flowing Chinese cash has come to an end,” said Bradley Murg, an affiliate fellow at Pacific Forum.

“Wang will need to clarify China’s financial commitments to its closest Southeast Asian ally and how Beijing will mitigate the reality – that the long-awaited Chinese investment expected to flow into Cambodia – is simply not here.”

These issues are expected to play out in Jakarta when ASEAN leaders meet next month.

Greenwood said the bland rationale offered for Wang’s visit – to strengthen strategic communication with the three Southeast Asian countries – appeared to match the nature and probable outcome of his brief trip.

“Overall, Wang’s visit can be expected to be viewed by Washington and its allies as routine with little indication that it will alter the status quo regarding the three countries’ present foreign and security policies or priorities,” he said.

(Source: VOA News)

Soutik Biswas

In his 1974 novel Tamas (Darkness), a vivid portrayal of the bloody partition of India, author Bhisham Sahni vividly depicts the atmosphere changing in a violence-wracked village as a plane circles above it thrice.

“People ventured out. The fighting seemed to have stopped and dead bodies were being disposed. People went back to their houses to assess their losses in terms of clothes and armaments.”

Sahni wrote a fictional account of the carnage that accompanied the partition as it split the subcontinent into the new independent nations of India and Pakistan. Religious violence erupted, displacing some 12 million people, and claiming the lives of up to one million people.

Fiction might have been mirroring reality when the planes swooped over the troubled villages, suggests Aashique Ahmed Iqbal, an Indian historian.

• The friendship that survived the division of a nation

The mere presence of the aircraft, he says, had a deterrent effect, dispersing mobs and giving villages time to prepare their defences. “The aeroplane played a small but highly crucial role during the division of the British empire in India into the independent dominions of India and Pakistan,” notes Mr Iqbal in his fascinating book, The Aeroplane and the Making of Modern India.

Of the 12 million people who fled from India and Pakistan, the overwhelming majority travelled by train, vehicle, cart and on foot. Up to 50,000 people – or less than 1% of the people evacuated – were flown out of what became India and Pakistan, Mr Iqbal says. A near-complete exchange of population was completed in three months, between September and November in 1947.

The Royal Indian Air Force (RIAF) – the aerial force of British India and later the dominion of India – would play a key role in quelling disorder and help in evacuating partition refugees, notes Mr Iqbal.

Every morning, their aircraft embarked on tactical reconnaissance missions, flying over railway tracks to safeguard refugee-laden trains from potential mob ambushes, and checking the rails for any signs of tampering. The planes would also look out for armed mobs and communicate with trains using wireless radio.

In September 1947, aircraft flying over Punjab reported a startling sight: up to 30,000 refugees trekking on foot along a 25-mile (40-km) stretch, as recounted by Mr Iqbal. These planes detected lurking mobs poised to attack weary refugees, relaying their locations to military patrols. They witnessed ominous columns of smoke rising from incinerated villages. “If you flew low,” Mr Iqbal writes, “you would spot bodies floating through Punjab’s famous canal system.”

• How a jacket and a briefcase shaped a partition love story

That was not all. RIAF planes – mostly trusty Dakotas – transported 1.5 million doses of cholera vaccines from Delhi to Karachi to help prevent an epidemic in the unsanitary refugee camps. They also dropped cooked food, sugar and oil for refugees. Both India and Pakistan used planes to drop leaflets warning rioters to cease violence, Mr Iqbal writes. The RIAF also ended up evacuating non-Muslims from distant parts of Pakistan like Multan, Bannu and Peshawar.

In scenes reminiscent of the desperate Afghans who attempted to flee their country by running alongside and clinging to military jets at Kabul airport in August 2021, the airfields of Delhi and Punjab in 1947 also witnessed moments of “great danger and desperation”.

“Refugees in camps near the airfields would rush to the planes as soon as they were permitted. Passengers desperate to be flown out of danger bribed crew with money and gold to board the plane,” Mr Iqbal writes.

Tickets were expensive. Passengers were allowed to carry very little luggage: there are accounts of a refugee from Hyderabad in India carrying only her Quran to Pakistan; and others carrying a “battered child’s cane chair” and a “moth-eaten-looking parrot”.

Not surprisingly, the planes were packed to the gills. Seats and carpets were removed to accommodate as many refugees as possible. Dakota DC-3 planes meant to carry 21 passengers often carried five times the number.

• Why was British India partitioned 75 years ago?

A private airline technician was given a pair of knuckle-dusters by his pilot to control the crowds. “He would punch his way to the door collecting undercarriage pins and punch his way into the plane before firmly locking in,” Mr Iqbal writes. Once the doors closed, the engines would start. “Then the crowd would automatically vanish due to the slip stream of the engines.”

That no major crashes were reported because of the overcrowding, lax airport security and overworked planes was remarkable. “Refugees often crowded airfields before planes landed because of lack of security. Matters were not helped by hostility of the authorities to air crews of the ‘other’ country,” writes Mr Iqbal.

By early 1947, India had 115 civilian airplanes run by 11 private companies. The end of World War II had sparked an “unprecedented boom” for civil aviation as Indian companies bought cheap aircraft – mostly Douglas DC-3 Dakotas – left behind by the departing US forces. But there was a glut in supply and not enough demand and profits plummeted. During partition, civilian planes not flying on scheduled routes were diverted to ferry refugees from Pakistan to India; and 10 of these planes were made available for the government.

But civilian airline operators were not able to cope with the mass evacuation. They also refused to risk aircraft and personnel for this “impossible task”. Eventually foreign help was sought: 21 British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC) jet planes flew “non-stop” for 15 days to move 6,300 people from Delhi to Karachi. They also carried 45,000kg of food, tents and vaccines for Muslim refugees stranded at Delhi airfields.

• Partition 70 years on: The turmoil, trauma – and legacy

Two Royal Air Force transport aircraft deployed to evacuate British nationals were also used to evacuate some 12,000 people between India and Pakistan. Only 2,790 were British personnel; the rest would be railways, post, and telegraph employees who would play a key role in the exchange of population on the ground, writes Mr Iqbal.

By October 1947, India realised this effort was still not enough. This was when ‘Operation India’ was launched: over six weeks in October and November, 21 planes – mainly Dakotas chartered from eight British companies – transported 35,000 people and more than 1.5 million pounds of baggage between India and Pakistan. Some 170 aviation personnel were flown in from Britain to help.

Indian aviation companies were overwhelmed by the magnitude of evacuation, so both the governments had to rely on chartered British aircraft. And the use of planes, says Mr Iqbal, “enabled the rapid constitution of independent India in the crucial first months after Independence”.

(Source: BBC)

Sumathi Bala

India is taking major strides to expand its influence in Southeast Asia, a move that will allow countries to counter China’s dominance in the region.

“India certainly is becoming more ambitious in Southeast Asia. There is no doubt about it,” said Harsh V. Pant, vice president for studies and foreign policy at Observer Research Foundation, a New Delhi-based think tank.

It has also become “more forceful and more upfront” about its ties with the region, he added.

Growing rivalry between India and China is seen as influencing New Delhi’s strategic calculation in strengthening its presence.

For a long time, Indian leaders had been “hesitant and reticent” about the country’s role in the region, due to its own tensions with China along the Himalayan border, noted Pant.

Relations have been fraught since a border clash with Chinese forces in 2020, which killed at least 20 Indian soldiers, according to the Indian army.

“I think the understanding in New Delhi had been: Let’s not wade into waters where China might be more uncomfortable,” Pant told CNBC, adding that Beijing has “enormous potential to create trouble for India.”

Since China hasn’t “budged” on the border issue, India “now feels there has been no real return for its cautious attitude towards Southeast Asia,” he added. 

India’s foreign ministry did not respond to CNBC’s request for comment.

In June, India’s external affairs minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, highlighted the border conflict was affecting relations between the two countries.

Until Sino-India relations achieve “some sense of normalcy,” Pant said, New Delhi has few options but to ramp up ties with countries — “big or small around China’s periphery, to ensure it has some leverage.”

Tightening ties

In recent months, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government has stepped up its outreach to regional countries aimed at balancing Beijing’s aggression.

The move reinforces India’s ongoing comprehensive strategic partnership with Southeast Asia.  

In June, New Delhi said it was giving a naval warship to Vietnam, in the latest sign of growing defense ties between both nations, said Satoru Nagao, non-resident fellow at Hudson Institute, based in Tokyo.

“India also trains pilots and ground crew of fighter jets of the Vietnam Air Force. Indian naval ships visited Vietnam constantly,” he added.

Vietnam is now planning to buy supersonic missiles and surface-to-air missiles from India, said Nagao, who specializes in defense strategy, foreign policy and security alliances.

“India’s ‘Look East’ policy began in 1991, well before China’s growing assertiveness was a real problem in Southeast Asia,” said Derek Grossman, a senior defense analyst at the Rand Corporation.

“But by 2014, when Modi turned the policy into ‘Act East,’ it was apparent that the region and world was dealing with a different kind of China — Xi’s China — which sought to flex its power more often and farther from Chinese shores,” he said referring to Chinese leader Xi Jinping.

Activists display anti-China placards and flags during a protest at a park in Manila on June 18, 2019, after a Chinese vessel last week collided with a Philippine fishing boat which sank in the disputed South China Sea and sailed away sparking outrage. Photo by TED ALJIBE / AFP) (Photo by TED ALJIBE/AFP via Getty Images)

Ted Aljibe | Afp | Getty Images

India caused a stir in late June when its foreign minister and his Filipino counterpart, Enrique Manalo, issued a joint statement, urging China to abide by The Hague’s 2016 arbitration decision on the South China Sea.

The joint statement sparked speculation that New Delhi was shifting away from its neutral posture on competing territorial claims in the region.

In a landmark ruling on the South China Sea dispute, the international tribunal in The Hague unanimously ruled in favor of the Philippines in a historic case against China.

China has rejected the 2016 ruling, describing it as “illegal and void.”

Beijing claims almost the entire South China Sea — an assertion that is rejected by Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei and the Philippines among others, in competing claims for the resource-rich waterway.

India “is bolstering strategic ties — diplomatic, economic, and security — to Southeast Asian states to help them balance or hedge against, or outright counter Chinese power,” said Rand’s Grossman.

“This is particularly salient to the maritime sphere, namely the South China Sea, where overlapping sovereignty disputes threaten regional stability and openness,” he added.

Complex dynamic

China’s expanding influence through its Belt and Road Initiative in Southeast Asia is also driving India’s calculation, according to Joanne Lin, co-coordinator of the ASEAN Studies Centre at ISEAS, at Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore.

As a result, “safeguarding India’s security, especially maritime security will be important,” Lin added.

Most countries in the region have supported China’s mega infrastructure project — Xi’s signature policy initiative aimed at expanding Beijing’s influence through a network of road, rail and sea connections across Asia, Europe and the Middle East.

Observers note Beijing’s more strident foreign policy, coupled with the political and economic leverage it could exert through the Belt and Road, has raised concerns in the region.

India is not a camp follower of either side. It continues to maintain a very independent streak in its foreign policy, which suits a large number of Southeast Asian countries.

Harsh V. Pant

OBSERVER RESEARCH FOUNDATION

Readjusting to an evolving international order defined primarily by the China-U.S. rivalry has also proven particularly challenging for Southeast Asian countries. 

Regional countries are “engaging India because it is a power in its own right,” noted Prashanth Parameswaran, a fellow at the Wilson Center and founder of the weekly ASEAN Wonk newsletter.

They see India as an “important piece of a broader strategy of shaping a more multipolar order rather than one that is centered around China or dominated by U.S.-China bipolar competition,” he added.

A regional survey published by the ASEAN Studies Centre at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute showed India’s standing has improved greatly among Southeast Asian nations, despite its neutral stance in Russia’s war against Ukraine. 

“India is the third top option for the region in hedging against the uncertainties of the US-China rivalry. Its ranking more than doubled from the last spot in 2022 to the third spot this year,” said ISEAS’s Lin, one of the authors of the survey. 

‘A way out’

Observers say that New Delhi also offers “a way out” for countries that seek to remain neutral in the U.S.-China conflict. 

“India is not a camp follower of either side,” said Pant from New Delhi’s Observer Research Foundation. “It continues to maintain a very independent streak in its foreign policy, which suits a large number of Southeast Asian countries.”

While China remained the most influential and strategic power in Southeast Asia, its standing has diminished, the Southeast Asia survey from February showed.

China continues to be regarded as the most influential economic power by 59.9% of the respondents. However, its influence has declined significantly from 76.7% in 2022, as countries grew more wary of Beijing.

For several states that “most distrust China in the region — namely the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Singapore,” India is “an additional partner to help counter Beijing,” noted Rand’s Grossman.

Still, New Delhi’s latest moves to deepen regional ties won’t go unnoticed by Chinese leaders, analysts noted.

China will be “cautious” about the developments, said Lin from ISEAS. “India’s growing influence in Southeast Asia and enhanced defense cooperation,” among other issues “will cause unease in Beijing,” she added.

Pant noted: “China will be watching this carefully and sending its own messages out.”

But given Southeast Asia “is a central pillar to India’s own Indo-Pacific strategy,” that will not deter New Delhi,” he added. “India’s push into the region will only continue to gather momentum.”

(Source: CNBC)