Foreign Affairs: Can Iran and Pakistan Stabilize Afghanistan?

Foreign Affairs published an article by University of Ottawa foreign policy specialist Kamran Bokhari in which he argues that the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan last summer has caused discomfort for many neighboring countries that are used to America carrying the heavy burdens in the region.

With the Taliban in control of Kabul, armed networks are likely to expand, and insecurity could spread across Afghanistan's borders. This possibility remains a cause for concern in as many as a dozen countries. Afghanistan's largest neighbors, Iran and Pakistan, are the two countries with the most influence in the country and the most at risk.

Their long borders with Afghanistan, as well as historical ethnic, linguistic, and cultural ties, have allowed them to play important roles in Afghanistan's internal affairs. By contrast, none of the three neighboring Central Asian countries or China, which share a border with Afghanistan, have the same level of influence in the country. China relies on both Iran and Pakistan to manage a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, and the Persian Gulf states rely on Pakistan to ensure their interests in the country are served.

In the wake of America's departure, Iran and Pakistan will be the main contenders in shaping the future of Taliban-run Afghanistan. Despite their many differences, both Iran and Pakistan seek stability and security in a country that has been at war for two generations. This will force them to cooperate in ways they have never done in the past.

Iran and Pakistan need the Taliban to form a government that can maintain a modicum of stability and prevent the spread of the Islamic State and other cross-border jihadist organizations. Having recently neutralized the IS threat on its western border in Iraq, Iran does not want to see jihadists gaining strength on its eastern border. Pakistan fears that IS activities in Afghanistan will galvanize militants within its borders.

The Taliban may now dominate Afghanistan militarily, but the movement is far from establishing effective governance throughout the country, let alone a viable economy in the absence of international recognition of its regime. Under these conditions, the Islamic State can gain ground. The militant group and other cross-border jihadist forces will capitalize on the Taliban's struggle to balance the pragmatism needed to govern with its core ideological commitments. If the Taliban moderate their behavior, they may lose many of their members to more radical groups.

The Taliban takeover of Afghanistan comes at a difficult time for both Iran and Pakistan. Pakistan is facing its deepest economic woes since independence, negotiating another loan with the International Monetary Fund, and exacerbated by unprecedented tensions between the military and civilian leaders. Similarly, after four decades, the mullahs' regime in Tehran is undergoing a major transition from a moderate to a more hardline leader and faces the looming question of who will succeed the ailing Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Iran is also experiencing a great deal of financial distress due to international sanctions. If Afghanistan starts exporting unrest, refugees and radicalization, it will only exacerbate issues for both countries.

Afghanistan is also a key gateway for Iran and Pakistan to Central Asia, especially in terms of energy and trade routes. Much of the BRI project runs through areas near the Afghan border and is vulnerable to strikes by Pakistani Taliban insurgents as well as separatist Baloch militants. Therefore, insecurity emanating from Afghanistan threatens Chinese plans in Pakistan. Similarly, the Iranians are hoping that a new nuclear deal will allow the Chinese to move forward with their plans to expand the BRI to their country.

For centuries, the states that originated on the Persian plateau to the west of Afghanistan and those centered on the Punjabi plains to the east have competed for territory. But Pakistan has a geographic and cultural advantage over Iran. Its border with Afghanistan is nearly three times as long as Iran's border with Afghanistan, giving Pakistan more room to influence events in the landlocked country. Iran has traditionally maintained ties with various Afghan minorities (including Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, Turkmen, Imaks and Baloch) and has capitalized on the fact that the country's common language is Dari (the Afghan variant of Persian), which allows Tehran to establish deep ties not only with these minority groups but also with the Pashtuns. Islamabad, on the other hand, has mainly exerted its influence in its western neighbor via the Pashtuns, who represent the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan and make up as much as 45% of the population. Pashtuns make up nearly one-fifth of Pakistan's population.

In the 1990s, Pakistani support for the predominantly Pashtun Taliban demonstrated the strength of this connection. Pakistani support helped the Taliban establish its first regime in 1996. Even after America overthrew the Taliban in 2001, Islamabad continued to support the group.

In contrast, Iran has bet on losing horses in Afghanistan. In the 1990s, it backed a coalition of smaller and weaker anti-Taliban groups that were largely formed from communities that tended to ally with Tehran, such as Tajiks and Shia Hazaras. This anti-Taliban camp never formed a political vanguard that could rival the Taliban and remained divided along ethnic lines.

This history might suggest that Kabul's new masters will be closely allied with Islamabad and reject Tehran. But the country's geopolitical landscape has changed dramatically in the 20 years since America toppled the first Taliban emirate in 2001. Pakistan does not have the same leverage over the Taliban as it did in the 1990s. The Taliban itself is no longer just a Pashtun phenomenon; in fact, they have made significant inroads into ethnic minority communities, which largely explains how the militant group quickly captured areas in the north of the country in early August 2021. In the past 15 years, Iran has also developed ties with elements of the Taliban, realizing that the movement is too powerful and important to be neglected.

Iran has come a long way since 2001, when it provided intelligence support to America and helped its Northern Alliance partners oust the Taliban from power. Relations between Iran and America deteriorated dramatically after that amid disagreements over Tehran's nuclear program and Washington's involvement in Iraq. The Iranians began cultivating ties with the Taliban sometime around 2005. By 2009, the Quds Force, the foreign operations arm of Iran's elite military force, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), was supplying weapons to Taliban insurgents. At the same time, Iran maintained ties with minority groups as well as lines of support for the U.S.-backed regime in Kabul, supplying it with up to $1 million annually.

For its part, Pakistan has also tried to build relationships with other forces in Afghanistan. It first reached out to the Kabul government and anti-Taliban factions about 15 years ago. These initiatives were not always warmly welcomed; longtime Taliban opponents remained deeply distrustful of Islamabad. Meanwhile, Pakistan's attempt to cooperate with the U.S. war effort led it to lose its monopoly on influence over the Taliban.

By mid-2010, the Taliban had not only established relations with Iran, but had also begun negotiations with Washington, established a political office in Qatar, and continued ties with other powers such as China, Russia, Turkey, European countries, and others. Islamabad still has the greatest links with the Afghan insurgency, particularly with the Haqqani faction based in eastern Afghanistan and the old Quetta Shura Council, the Taliban's original stronghold in the south of the country.

During the Taliban insurgency, Iran and Pakistan maintained channels of communication and support with both the government in Kabul and the militants. But now, with the Taliban in power and opposition forces largely crushed, Tehran and Islamabad face a situation for which they were likely unprepared. How can they ensure that those they helped launch an insurgency will now govern in a way that does not lead to wider insecurity and jeopardize their national interests?

Iran and Pakistan recognize that they must cooperate in managing the security situation in Afghanistan. The formation of the Taliban's interim government indicates a degree of coordination between the two countries. The initial government unveiled by the Taliban was dominated by hardline commanders close to Pakistan. But within a few days, after some talks between Iranian and Pakistani officials on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting in Dushanbe in September 2021, minority figures with close ties to Iran were nominated for key portfolios.

By doing so, the Taliban hope to achieve two goals: Convince minorities that they will be represented in the interim authority and in a future government, and convince the international community that they have responded to calls for an inclusive government.

Despite these attempts at cooperation, Iran and Pakistan cannot help but be wary of each other. Tehran is wary of Islamabad's close ties with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Pakistan remains deeply concerned about its arch-enemy India's close alliance with Iran.

Iran and Pakistan will have the greatest influence on whatever outcome emerges in Taliban-run Afghanistan. Great powers such as China and Russia will rely on their bilateral relations with Tehran and Islamabad to try to ensure that uncertainty in Afghanistan does not upset their strategic plans for Central and South Asia.

Assuming Afghanistan eventually achieves some semblance of stability, both the Iranians and Pakistanis will seek to leverage their influence to advance their economic interests in the country and in the region. But for the foreseeable future, both will struggle to ensure that Afghanistan does not undermine their national security.